



Daily Report

East Europe

FBIS-EEU-91-232
Tuesday
3 December 1991

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CONTENTS

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NOTICE TO READERS: An * indicates material not disseminated in electronic form.

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Poland, CSFR, Hungary Meet on Trade Issues [PAP]	1
Agreement Signed [PAP]	1
Defense Ministers' Conference Meets in Budapest [MTI]	1
Goncz Opens European Peace Conference on SFRY [MTI]	2

ALBANIA

Buqi, Others Receive National Day Greetings [ATA]	3
Alia Dismisses Republican Party Ministers [Tirana Radio]	3
Lack of Quorum Prevents People's Assembly Session [Tirana Radio]	3
Communist Party Opposes Early Elections [Tirana Radio]	3
Council Deplores Republican Party Memorandum [ATA]	3
Socialist Party Group Issues Statement [ATA]	4

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Foreign Policy Adviser on Recognition of Ukraine [CSTK]	5
Czech Government Approves Draft Budget 29 Nov [Prague Radio]	5
Klaus: Approval 'Shocking Surprise' [Prague TV]	5
Pithart: Reaction 'Unjustified' [Prague Radio]	5
Federal Government Sets Limits on Wage Hikes [NARODNA OBRODA 29 Nov]	6
Slovak Budget Approved Against KDH Opposition [SLOVENSKY DENNIK 29 Nov]	6
Cabinet Approves Havel Constitutional Proposals [CSTK]	6
Groups Oppose Havel's Unicameral Assembly Idea [CSTK]	6
Havel Views Political Talks, Minority Issues [Prague Radio]	7
Calfa Condemns Slovak Nationalist 'Madmen' [MLADA FRONTA DNES 27 Nov]	8
Ivan Carnogursky Survives Confidence Vote [CSTK]	9
Moravian-Silesian Representatives Write Havel [Prague Radio]	9

HUNGARY

Diplomatic Ties With Russia, Ukraine Authorized [Budapest Radio]	10
Jeszzenszky Interviewed on SFRY Conflict, Ukraine [Budapest Radio]	10
Serbian Accusation of Mercenary Training Rejected [Budapest Radio]	13
Deadline Imposed on CSFR Over Bos Dam Dispute [MTI]	13
Horn Evaluates Romanian Ties, Previews Visit [Budapest Radio]	14
Antall Comments on Talks With Bulgaria's Ganev [MTI]	14
Oil Deliveries From USSR 'Adequate' for 1991 [MTI]	15
Foreign Ministry State Secretary Somogyi Resigns [MTI]	15
Opposition Protests Central Bank Reshuffle [MTI]	15
Raffay, Annus View Defense Budget, Security Policy [Budapest Radio]	15

POLAND

Government Decision To Recognize Ukraine Reported [PAP]	18
Government Statement Published [Warsaw Radio]	18
Foreign Ministry Comments [PAP]	18
Restructuring of Trade Links With Ukraine Planned [PAP]	18
Agreement Reached on Transit of Soviet Troops [PAP]	19
Skubiszewski Discusses State of European Relations [Paris LE FIGARO 28 Nov]	19

Walesa, NSZZ Solidarity View Small Constitution [Warsaw Radio]	20
Walesa Remarks Reported [Warsaw TV]	20
Text of 'Small Constitution' [RZECZPOSPOLITA 30 Nov-1 Dec]	22
Five-Party Coalition, Government Talks Continue [PAP]	23
Council of Ministers Examines Financial Situation [PAP]	23

ROMANIA

Chebeleu Discusses Ukraine Independence Issues [Bucharest Radio]	25
PNT-cd Lists Objections to New Constitution [DREPTATEA 26-27 Nov]	26
PAC Urges Voters Not To Endorse Constitution [ROMPRES]	26
UDMR's Szocs Criticizes New Constitution [BESZELO 30 Nov]	27

YUGOSLAVIA

International

Milosevic, Vance Discuss UN Peacekeeping Force [TANJUG]	28
Milosevic Satisfied With Talks [Belgrade TV]	28
Markovic Addresses European Cities Conference [TANJUG]	29
EC Lifts Sanctions on Four Republics, Not Serbia [TANJUG]	29
Ambassador in Brussels Deems EC Decision 'Hasty' [Belgrade Radio]	29
Paris Club Refuses To Negotiate Yugoslav Debt [TANJUG]	30

Federal

Kostic Urges EC To Understand Threat to Serbs [TANJUG]	30
Kostic Views Prospects for 14th Cease-Fire [TANJUG]	31
Government Seeks 'Urgent Deployment' of UN Forces [TANJUG]	31
FEC Dismisses Radio-Communications Chief [TANJUG]	31

Slovenia

Bucar Rejects Request for Confidence Vote [Ljubljana Radio]	31
Rupel: Vance Believes Croats 'Making Mistake' [TANJUG]	32
Ministry Sends Letter to CSCE Official [Ljubljana Radio]	32

Croatia

President Tudjman Holds News Conference 2 Dec [Zagreb Radio]	32
Separovic Appeals to Spain for Support [Madrid Radio]	34
Government Proclaims 'Compulsory Work Order' [Zagreb Radio]	34
Status of Paraga's Citizenship Remains Open [TANJUG]	35

Serbia

Jovanovic Assails EC Sanctions Decision [TANJUG]	35
Commentary Criticizes Sanctions [Belgrade Radio]	35
Jovanovic Accuses Budapest of Interference [Budapest Radio]	36
Jovanovic Protests to Arbitration Committee [TANJUG]	36
Kosutic Says Serbian-Croatian Coexistence Possible [TANJUG]	36
Belgrade Papers Discuss Moves for Autonomy [TANJUG]	37

Vojvodina

Hungarians Criticized for Joining Anti-Serb Group [MAGYAR HIRLAP 30 Nov]	37
Hungarian Representative on Community's Status [Budapest Radio]	38

Kosovo

LDK Chairman Requests Help From UN Forces	[BUJKU 23 Nov]	39
Assembly Appeals for Support of Albanian People	[Tirana Radio]	40
Kosovars Celebrate National Holiday of Albania	[Belgrade Radio]	41

Bosnia-Herzegovina

President Izetbegovic Addresses SDA Congress	[Sarajevo Radio]	41
SDA Urges International Recognition of Republics	[TANJUG]	43
Socialist Democrats Calls For Preserving Nation	[TANJUG]	44
Article Examines Issue of Military Industry	[EKONOMSKA POLITIKA 4 Nov]	44

Poland, CSFR, Hungary Meet on Trade Issues

LD0312010491 Warsaw PAP in English 1911 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 2—Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary will determine the principles of an agreement on mutual trade exchange by the end of the current year, and sign an agreement on gradual removal of barriers in trade between Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary in July 1, 1992, at the latest, Polish Minister for Foreign Economic Relations Dariusz Ledworowski announced Monday after talks with his Czechoslovak opposite number Vladimir Dlouhy and Hungary's Bela Kadar here.

The ministers of the "triangle" decided that liberalization in mutual trade should be spread over the period of 5-10 years, with customs duty on some commodities to be removed as soon as the agreement is signed. Agreements reached among the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] group of states are to serve as a model solution.

The barriers consist not only of customs duties but also quantitative restrictions and taxes. The decisions contained in the agreements reached with the European communities will be treated as the starting point in the liberalization of trade within the triangle, but each of the sides may go even further and negotiate still better terms of liberalization in trade with a partner country, Ledworowski declared.

The sides also found it necessary to settle all arrears due in transfer roubles still before the liberalization agreement comes into force.

In line with the Kracow three-partite declaration of October 6, 1991, the ministers of the triangle exchanged information on cooperation between financial institutions and banks of the three countries, including an agreement on avoiding double taxation and protection of investments which have already been negotiated and ready to sign.

The ministers positively assessed cooperation in the field of transport, communications and ecology within the triangle.

Agreement Signed

LD0112010291 Warsaw PAP in English 2226 GMT
30 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 30—A document called "Pro Memoria" which expresses a common standpoint for the "triangle" countries (Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia) was signed on Saturday by the respective ministers dealing with economic co-operation with foreign countries—Dariusz Ledworowski for Poland, Vladimir Dlouhy for Czechoslovakia and Bela Kadar for Hungary. "Pro Memoria" states the "triangle" policy on liberalization of trade between the "triangle" countries, their position on EC help to the USSR and their participation

in that help. "We have achieved a complete consensus on the most important question for us—the liberalisation of trade between our countries," said Ledworowski.

"After the consultation period we will start the process of negotiation. The appointed working committee of negotiators will be creating liberal principles of trade and preparing an agreement up to the end of May 1992. In this work we will be relying on the experience of the EC and EFTA". Direct trading concessions will be negotiated bilaterally. From January experts will start working out a list of goods which will initially be allowed into the neighbouring countries. "We agreed that the period of liberalisation should be 5 years," said Ledworowski. "This involves settling the question of which goods will be allowed into markets and when, and also how quickly the quantitative limits will be removed, as soon as the agreement is signed", he continued. "The next meeting of ministers will take place in May 1992 when we will also be preparing an agreement. I think that we have fulfilled the task entrusted to us by the Krakow declaration," said Poland's minister.

The ministers also discussed the "triangle's" help for the USSR, financed by the EC. "In our letter to the Community we expressed our astonishment that until now it has been so very modest", said Ledworowski. Although not directly interested, Poland has signed the appeal to the EC by Czechoslovakia and Hungary for special protection for the Adriatic pipeline. "We acknowledged this declaration by Poland as an expression of solidarity", said Bela Kadar the Hungarian minister. The significance of the meeting and the signed agreement was enhanced by the presence of the Czechoslovak deputy prime minister and foreign minister, Jiri Dienstbier. "This is a very important step because we can only achieve success when we succeed in working together and co-ordinating our activity", he said. Dienstbier stressed that the U.S. and Western Europe treat the three states as a united whole. "A few months ago we succeeded in negotiating the opening of the borders. A free trade area would be the next important step forward", he concluded.

Defense Ministers' Conference Meets in Budapest

LD3011214191 Budapest MTI in English 1835 GMT
30 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 30 (MTI)—The three-day conference of leaders of the Hungarian, Polish and Czechoslovak Ministries of Defence in charge of political, humanitarian and welfare matters ended in Budapest on Saturday with the signing of a joint statement. The meeting was held as the continuation of the conference in Zakopane in September, 1990. The deputy ministers reported about the changes that have taken place in their countries and armies. They stated the aim of the transformations is to intensify the security of their countries, by taking the new internal conditions and the international situation into consideration. The joint

statement notes the three countries are closely cooperating in political, military and welfare issues. One of the goals set down in the statement is for relations between the three armies to extend to all levels. Leaders of the delegations met Hungarian Minister of Defence Lajos Fur. The Polish and Czechoslovak delegations left Hungary on Saturday afternoon.

Goncz Opens European Peace Conference on SFRY

*AU0212115191 Budapest MTI in English 1352 GMT
29 Nov 91*

[Text] Budapest, November 29 (MTI)—“Human lives and centuries-old values have been destroyed in senseless wars. The current war in our region causes an especially severe problem by jeopardizing Central Europe's drive to catch up with the more advanced part of the continent,” said Hungarian President Arpad

Goncz at the Friday [29 November] opening of a peace conference held by European cities in Budapest to promote the settlement of the Yugoslavian conflict.

Goncz drew attention to the trials and tribulations suffered by inhabitants of the affected Yugoslavian towns, and stressed that there can be no peace in the region without the sovereignty of local nations.

The delegates from 36 towns of 12 European countries and the representatives of international organizations and city federations were greeted by Gabor Demszky, mayor of Budapest, on behalf of the organizing city council. He said that the aim of the conference was to mobilize European cities and nations in order to help halt the civil war raging in Yugoslavia. The conflicts between republics need to be settled during a democratic dialogue based on mutual interests, Gabor Demszky said.

Buqi, Others Receive National Day Greetings

AU0112204591 Tirana ATA in English 1044 GMT
1 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 1 (ATA)—The chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania, Ylli Buqi has received messages of greetings on occasion of the national day from Konstandinos Mitsotakis, prime minister of Greece; Lojzen Peterle, chairman of the Executive Council of the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia; Jozsef Antall, prime minister of the Republic of Hungary; I. Silayev, chairman of the Interstate Economic Council of the USSR; Vo Van Kiet, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam; Marian Calfa, prime minister of the government of the Federal Czech and Slovak Republic, and Hun Sen, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the State of Cambodia.

Muhamet Kapllani, foreign minister of the Republic of Albania, has received a message of greetings on occasion of the national day from Ibrahim Rugova, chairman of the Coordinating Council of the Albanian Political Parties in Yugoslavia, whereas Kostaq Karoli, chief of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Albania, has received a message from Colin Powell, chairman of the Staff of the Common Chiefs of the U.S.A. [title as received]

Alia Dismisses Republican Party Ministers

AU0112204191 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] In a decree dated today, 1 December 1991, President Ramiz Alia approved the proposal presented on the government's behalf by Ylli Buqi, chairman of the Council of Ministers, for the dismissal of Teodor Kareco, secretary-general to the Council of Ministers; Fatos Bitincka, minister of transportation; and Alfred Karamuco, chairman of the State Control Commission.

Lack of Quorum Prevents People's Assembly Session

AU0212205091 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] A plenary session of the People's Assembly should have been held at 1600 GMT today. However, Presidency Chairman Kastriot Islami did not open the session because few deputies were present. He said that the People's Assembly will continue its proceedings in parliamentary groups in order to appoint the Radio-Television Managing Council.

Communist Party Opposes Early Elections

AU0112213291 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1900 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] A declaration issued by the Albanian Communist Party [PKSh] states that the PKSh's Central Organizing Committee views with concern the manner in which some political forces are attempting to bring forward the elections.

It is not in anybody's interest to embark on an electoral campaign in this extremely serious economic situation, in which the people lack bread and fuel for heating on the threshold of winter. The National Stability Government, despite the difficulties facing it, is working to carry out the duties with which it has been entrusted. The Democratic Party's statement about the government's alleged paralysis is simply a consciously contrived political maneuver. Even if this government were to perform the impossible, as if in a fairy tale, some excuse would be found to bring forward the elections. The Republican Party's memorandum and the stand adopted by Sabri Godo, this party's leader, are also malevolent political stage tricks.

The PKSh is convinced that early elections and possible demonstrations demanding them would not slacken but tighten the noose around the people's neck, and could lead again to mass suicide, strikes, and possible sabotage. The PKSh considers that May or June is the most suitable time for the start of the electoral campaign. After an appalling autumn without sowing and a winter full of dreams about land distribution, it would be fatal to confuse the spring sowing with the elections. The PKSh welcomes all aspects of the Agrarian Party's statement, and calls on the political parties, especially the Democratic, Republican, and Social Democratic Parties, to place the interests of the people above their narrow party interests. The PKSh also asks Ramiz Alia, president of the republic, to examine the situation realistically, without hurrying to join the games of certain politicians. The people need to be given sufficient time to be granted their land and to complete the spring sowing, and only then should they start the electoral campaign, the PKSh's declaration concludes.

Council Deplores Republican Party Memorandum

AU0112205991 Tirana ATA in English 0900 GMT
1 Dec 91

[Text] Tirana, December 1 (ATA)—The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Albania made a statement on November 29 with regard to a special meeting held on November 28, 1991, to examine the promemoria of Mr. Teodor Kareco, secretary-general of the Council of Ministers; Fatos Bitincka, minister of transportation; and Alfred Karamuco, chairman of the State Control Commission, which was delivered to the chairman of the Council of Ministers on November 27, 1991.

The public opinion has been acquainted with the content of this promemoria, which although is addressed to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers with the request for immediate examination, was frontpaged in the newspaper "REPUBLIKA." In this way the three ministers of the Republican Party dissociated themselves from the responsibility and goodwill to discuss with the other

colleagues of the government the problems they forwarded. The Council of Ministers regretfully observes that the document named promemoria was drafted mainly for the public and not to contribute to the improvement of the work of the government at a time when the people need more than ever messages and actions which guarantee stability.

Having presented the conclusions of the government with regard to the promemoria delivered by the ministers of the Republican Party and their attitude which was described as withdrawal from collective and individual responsibility in the face of the current difficulties, the statement of the Council of Ministers stresses that the government asked the authors of promemoria to withdraw it. They turned down this request. As the refusal of promemoria is considered as a condition that Mr. Teodor Kareco, Mr. Fatos Bitincka, and Mr. Alfred Karamuco continue to be members of the government, says the statement, the Council of Ministers unanimously backs up the proposal according to which the prime minister should ask the president of the republic their withdrawal from the government.

Socialist Party Group Issues Statement

*AU2911203791 Tirana ATA in English 1819 GMT
29 Nov 91*

[Text] Tirana, November 29 (ATA)—The statement of November 26, 1991 of the parliamentary group of the Democratic Party and of its national council declared ultimately of a government crisis, which may lead to a parliamentary crisis and then to a general crisis. The nation, the people and the country are threatened by chaos and catastrophe.

All what was declared in the streets and in rallies were expressed in this statement. This crisis is not a work of the Socialist Party and its deputies. It is not us who left the parliament hall in the most decisive moments. On the contrary, after many efforts we managed to create a relative and indispensable tranquillity. The pluralistic parliament adopted important laws on the basis of which democratic and proper conditions were created for the activity of the government of stability.

But instead of working to consolidate every concrete steps we have made, the so called opposition which in fact is present in all the structures of the state power,

with a great lack of responsibility and political provincialism, is seeking with all manner of means to disrupt the social equilibrium of the country, trying to throw onto the back of the people the burden of party crisis or the lost of credibility among the masses. And according to the old tune, the blame is put on somewhere else, accusing the [words indistinct].

It is not the SP [Socialist Party] and its deputies those who organized illegitimate rallies. It is not the SP and its deputies those who appealed that the land should not be distributed. It is not the SP and its deputies those who appeal for the closure of the ministry of public order. It is not the SP and its deputies those who demand the solution of the problems through pressures in the streets. On the contrary, they are for the functioning of all the legitimate institutions of the state power.

Four demands are presented in the statement. Proposals are made on them. All of them are matters to be discussed and solved. We have our progressive opinion on them. Besides those presented in the statement of the DP, [Democratic Party] we have our opinions also with regard to the reorganization of the local power, for the special legislation so that it prevent the organized crime, on symbols and many other things. But how will these be reached? Through ultimatums?? This is not the language of democracy. This is not the language of Europe. This is not the language of the CSCE.

All the question lies in the new elections. All others are pretexts to attain certain electoral goals.

The Socialist Party has more than once voiced its opinion and it confirmed this in its first national conference that they should be realised as soon as the minimum economic, social and juridical conditions be created. Above all we think that prior to elections, the constitution of the Republic should be adopted, because without it, conditions will be created to trample underfoot the basic principles of democracy, defined in the CSCE documents.

We think that priority should be attached to the most important thing: When will elections take place? Therefore we demand first of all this problem be extensively discussed in the parliament, among the political parties, the round table of the government, to listen to the people and to realise their desire and will and not the games of the politicians.

Foreign Policy Adviser on Recognition of Ukraine

LD0212162691 Prague CSTK in English 1518 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Prague Dec 2 (CSTK)—Czechoslovakia is ready to move towards recognising the Ukraine if it declares its independence, Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel's foreign policy adviser, Alexandr Vondra, told journalists today.

Vondra said Czechoslovakia should draw up a bilateral treaty with the Ukraine and establish diplomatic ties. But this would not interfere with the planned Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty, he said. Czechoslovakia would expect an independent Ukraine to respect disarmament agreements and honour its debts.

Regarding Subcarpathian Rus, Vondra said Czechoslovakia will adhere to the principle of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) on the confirmation of the present European borders. He called for "natural regional cooperation between east Slovakia and Subcarpathian Rus" on its eastern border.

The region of Subcarpathian Rus became part of newly independent Czechoslovakia in 1919. On the basis of a 1945 Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement it was incorporated into the Soviet Ukraine.

Vondra said Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev is expected to visit Czechoslovakia to initial the Czechoslovak-Soviet treaty before Christmas.

Vondra said Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel will pay an official visit to Egypt December 15-17 to seek new markets for Czechoslovak exports as well as contracts to complete plants in the Middle East.

Havel intends to address the Federal Assembly (parliament) tomorrow to explain his recent legislative initiatives aimed at keeping the country together.

Referring to the current dispute between the federal and Czech Republic governments over the 1992 state budget, Vondra said Havel does not support the latter's demand for a greater share of the prepared budget. (The Czech Government wants 43 per cent instead of 41.5 per cent of the federal budget.)

Czech Government Approves Draft Budget 29 Nov

LD2911230791 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 2130 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] At today's extraordinary session, the Czech Government approved the proposed draft budget of the Czech Republic, noting that it is necessary to adjust the share of joint incomes to 43 percent and to specify the considered transfer of payments from wages from the Czech Republic to the Slovak Republic according to a more specified budget.

In view of the complexity of the issues under discussion, the government will continue its work tomorrow afternoon.

Klaus: Approval 'Shocking Surprise'

LD2911232591 Prague Federal 1 Television Network
in Czech 2145 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Excerpt] Finance Minister Klaus is in our studio; his reaction to the Czech Government approving the draft budget:

[Klaus] When I arrived in your studio 10 minutes ago, I was not aware of the decision of the Czech Government. I had no idea about it, and thus it is an unimaginable and shocking surprise for me. It is difficult for me to believe what I heard here in your studio.

The idea that the Federal Government could discuss all three budgets and the federal budget at its session on Sunday is now, of course, out of the question. It seems to me totally unimaginable to break—in this totally unilateral way—the agreements concluded in Bratislava, which were accepted by all the sides as the only possible path for the budgets. [passage omitted]

Pithart: Reaction 'Unjustified'

LD0212103191 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 0300 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Interview with Czech Prime Minister Petr Pithart by Miroslav Dittrich on 2 December; place not given—recorded]

[Text] The extraordinary session of the Czech Government, which assumed a standpoint on yesterday's statement of the Federal Government and also on the division of joint income of the state budget, ended at 0200. After the end of the session, editor Miroslav Dittrich invited Petr Pithart to the microphone. The Czech prime minister first read the statement of the Czech Government:

[Pithart] The Government of the Czech Republic noted that there were no reasons for changing its resolution of last Friday on the budget of the Czech Republic. The government considers unjustified the reactions of the Federal Government and of the representatives of three parties and movements to this resolution. It insists that it is not breaking up the federation with its draft of the budget. It is prepared, anyway, for further talks.

[Dittrich] These talks will take place on Wednesday. There should be meetings of the three prime ministers. So will there be a certain struggle there, so to speak?

[Pithart] I do not know what you mean by struggle. A budget is always an issue on which it is difficult to agree. We, as a government, will come back to the problem and explain it to the public quite clearly. From this will proceed our idea (?on the way) further talks should take place. May I point out that the the sum at issue is one

percent of the overall sum of all three budgets, and this also shows that this cannot be a sum that could break up the federation.

[Dittrich] Vice Prime Minister Klaus has said that today the issue is not the billions, but the joint state. You have actually also said that it is not the billions of korunas that matters.

[Pithart] No, I have said that the sum, on its own, is not large enough to break up the federation, as long as there are other reasons for having it. This is a political and also an economic problem, and at this moment it is impossible to divide them.

Federal Government Sets Limits on Wage Hikes

AU0312090491 Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA
in Slovak 29 Nov 91 pp 1-2

[CSTK report: "Ruml on the Carpet"]

[Excerpts] Prague— The discussion on the state budget of the federation for 1992 and on the CSFR's aggregate public budgets for 1992 was to be the main item on the agenda of yesterday's session of the Federal Government. In view of the decision of the Czech Republic Government to discuss the budget of the Czech Republic only today, the Federal Government decided to postpone the discussion on this item until an extraordinary session to be held on 1 December. [passage omitted]

At its session yesterday, the Federal Government set the limit for wage increases [upravila smerny rast miezd] in the fourth quarter of the year. At the recommendation of the CSFR Council of Economic and Social Accord, it raised the limit from 29 percent, its present level, to 32 percent. This increase responds to the expected increased in the cost of living in the last quarter of the year. The respective legal regulations will be amended in line with the government's ruling.

Slovak Budget Approved Against KDH Opposition

AU0312090191 Bratislava SLOVENSKY DENNIK
in Slovak 29 Nov 91 p 2

[CSTK report: "Democratic Party About the Christian Democratic Movement"]

[Text] The Christian Democratic Movement [KDH] Club of Ministers disagrees with the draft Slovak budget for 1992, on the grounds that the budget is disadvantageous for Slovakia. The KDH Club of Ministers hopes that the three parties concerned—the Slovaks, the Czechs, and the federation—fail to come to an agreement precisely on the budget. This was stressed by Peter Lukac, member of the Democratic Party Presidium, who—as he pointed out—attended the Slovak Government session on the budget yesterday in Prague.

"The Slovak Government session [of 26 November] on the budget was attended by 16 of its members, four of whom were KDH members. Three of them voted against

all drafts of the resolution. Only Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky joined the coalition partners' vote for the budget's approval," Peter Lukac reported.

Peter Lukac expressed doubts as to whether the KDH chairman will succeed in "guaranteeing such a voting discipline of all KDH members that they vote for the budget's approval in the Slovak National Council. If they do not vote for the budget's approval, it will mean Czechoslovakia will break up precisely over the budget problem," he added.

Cabinet Approves Havel Constitutional Proposals

AU2911153691 Prague CSTK in English 2222 GMT
27 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 27 (CSTK)— At an extraordinary session attended by President Vaclav Havel, the Czechoslovak Government today approved Havel's drafts for two constitutional bills and a draft on the jurisdictions of the federation.

Both approved draft bills were submitted by Havel to the Presidium of the federal parliament last week. The draft bill on the procedure for adopting a new federal constitution (submitted November 21) provides for ratification of the federal constitution by the regional parliaments of the Czech and Slovak Republics.

The draft bill on the procedure for calling a referendum (submitted November 22) allows the president to call a plebiscite if he obtains approval from the Federal Government, and also makes it possible for citizens to propose holding a referendum.

The draft for federal powers lists the areas in which the Federal Government would retain its powers, in particular foreign relations, defense, and security. The draft also lists the federation's powers in the economy, environment, industrial relations, and social affairs.

A new element, according to Premier Marian Calfa, is the proposal to set up coordinating councils in areas where it is necessary for federal and republic bodies to proceed in unison.

Calfa stressed that the government would consider omission or rejection of any of the powers listed as threatening the purpose of the federation's existence.

The draft on jurisdictions was approved unanimously.

Groups Oppose Havel's Unicameral Assembly Idea

LD3011171391 Prague CSTK in English
1354 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Prague Nov 29 (CSTK)—The majority of political groups in the Czechoslovak parliament are opposed to President Vaclav Havel's idea of a uni-cameral parliament and Federal Council and favour a bi-cameral parliament, first vice chairman of the parliament Zdenek Jicinsky said today. Havel voiced his idea in a keynote

televised speech on November 17. Jicinsky told a press conference that the parliamentary groups are almost united, with the exception of the group of Civic Democratic Party (ODS) deputies, in the view that the electoral law should not be changed very much and thus support the system of proportional representation.

Jicinsky said the 19th joint meeting of both chambers of the Czechoslovak parliament, starting December 3 and likely to finish December 18-20, might be very complicated as some of the 30 points on the agenda are controversial. Federal parliament vice chairman Jozef Stank (Democratic Left Party-SDL) said the agenda includes three draft amendments to the referendum law, the law defining mechanisms of conducting a referendum and to the law on a new Czechoslovak constitution. The amendments were proposed by President Havel. The Federal parliament will also review the results of the federal budget over the first nine months of the year, and discuss a draft federal budget for 1992, as well as financial bills. It is also expected to discuss a report on Czechoslovak foreign policy.

Havel Views Political Talks, Minority Issues

LD0112173991 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 1315 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Interview with President Vaclav Havel by Stanislava Dufkova at Havel's apartment in Prague on 29 November; from the "Conversations at Lany" program—recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted]

[Havel] On 3 December, at the beginning of the Federal Assembly's plenary session, I will deliver an address. My plan is to deliver a long speech, and in it I intend to provide an extensive explanation of the purpose of these laws and the reasons for my submitting them. [passage omitted]

[Dufkova] Both last week and this week you continued your talks with political parties, and thus you were able to conclude your opinion of the political parties.

[Havel] I did, indeed, meet the main political parties, their representatives, and members of their parliamentary clubs. During each meeting, we extensively and repeatedly discussed both my legislative initiatives and the situation in our country in general. We also discussed the parties' policies. My impression from these talks was good. They were businesslike, the parties adopted a positive approach to my initiatives, although they did not conceal some objections or hesitations.

Perhaps I ought to recall my meeting, in short succession, with the representatives of three Hungarian parties and my realization during the talks that the problem of our minorities is among the open problems we are tackling. This problem is slightly overshadowed by other

problems. For example, the members and representatives of the Hungarian parties told me quite unanimously about the problem for the members of national minorities created by the Kosice Government program [first policy statement of the postwar government promulgated in 1945] and the presidential postwar decrees. This concerns mainly the members of the Hungarian and German minorities. Some remained in our republic, and their assets were confiscated after the war on the basis of the collective guilt principle. Nowadays, it is only their children who are alive, and they are finding it difficult to come to terms with the fact that such a broad-minded restitution process did not take them into account.

This matter is extremely complicated. For many reasons, restitutions, as such, are not applicable to the pre-1948 period. Nevertheless, despite this, we should keenly follow this specific problem. I myself intend to ask a group of experts to assess the whole topic and to look for possibilities to take some manageable steps that could in a certain acceptable way rectify at least some of the injustices that are still experienced in this milieu.

Since I have been talking about the Hungarian minority, I should stress that my feeling from these talks was one of good statehood and of the democratic nature of the political forces representing our minorities. [passage omitted]

I think that all peoples (?of the world) should be granted the degree of self-determination that they deserve, that they long for, and that they were denied under the communist regime. However, at the same time, we should rapidly build the structures of a civic society and a relevant legal system so that we may, to the maximum possible degree, rule out the danger that this longing to translate their self-determination into reality will not grow into nationalism, with its malice, egoism, and with its assumed mistrust in those who hold different views.

[Dufkova] In your last Conversations, you said, among other things, that you would like to ask those who blame you for the present deadlocked constitutional situation to tell you when and how. Milan Knazko [actor and leading activist in November 1989, former Slovak minister for external relations in Meciar government] reacted to your request with a long open letter.

[Havel] I read his letter, and it would be easy for me to react to individual accusations put forward by Milan Knazko. As far as this letter is concerned, I am saddened by the fact that Milan Knazko could not resist making offensive comparisons with Gottwald, etc. Regarding the matter-of-fact nucleus of his rebukes, I have to say that I am unable to consider the majority of them to be the kind of criticism that could really enrich me, that could help me. [passage omitted]

Calfa Condemns Slovak Nationalist 'Madmen'*AU0212134991 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES
in Czech 27 Nov 91 pp 1, 6*

[Interview with Prime Minister Marian Calfa by Jiri Leschtina; place and date not given: "Madmen Must Be Opposed"]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Leschtina] What powers will the Federal Government demand back from the republics?

[Calfa] You are using familiar terminology in your question—the federation versus the republics. We are putting forward a quite new concept of executive powers aimed at sweeping away the centralist model—on the level of the federation and the republics—and starting from scratch. The power-sharing law only preserves the centralist model of 1968. Powers were simply transferred from one center, the federal center, to other centers—the republican centers. As a consequence, officials are "emigrating" from federal ministries and the republican ministries are swelling. However, in our new concept we are not seeking to transfer as many powers as possible to the republics, or vice versa; we want to destroy these powers. If there is something that district offices can deal with, it does not need to be controlled by a federal or republican center. Only the matters they cannot deal with will be divided between the federation and the republics, depending on where the maximum usefulness and effect can be gained. For example, from the point of view of our integration into the international transportation system, it would be useful if a railroad system concept were created by the federation. Then, regional offices can take over the administration of individual railroad stations.

[Leschtina] We must expect that no matter how functional the model of the federation is, it will meet with strong resistance from Slovak separatists and also some Christian Democratic Party members.

[Calfa] If we create a really functional concept, then we will have the most effective weapon against the separatists in our hands. We intend to give this concept to the governments and parliaments and publish it on as large a scale as possible. We want all the nationalist objections to be heard clearly. If there are no rational arguments against the functionality of our model, but only mostly politically motivated objections, then this will be an indication to the electorate that separatists are not concerned about the rational functioning of the state. Yes, we want to bring the situation to a head so that nationalist forces will have to decide whether to accept a functional model of the state or to step onto unconstitutional ground, in the full awareness of the fact that they are acting without the voters' mandate.

[Leschtina] What if separatists decide to take unconstitutional steps, no matter what?

[Calfa] The government will call on all the federal bodies throughout the state to respect the current Constitution. At the same time, the government will continue to act as the highest executive organ of state power. Indeed, all the federal ministers have sworn an oath before the president of the republic that they will respect the Constitution.

[Leschtina] The president has involved himself in the discussion on the constitutional setup, perhaps even more energetically than the Federal Government. According to our information, you were the only person Vaclav Havel consulted in advance of his 7 November speech. Can you confirm this?

[Calfa] Yes.

[Leschtina] Does it mean that the steps taken by the Federal Government and by the president were coordinated from the very beginning?

[Calfa] The president's and the government's proposals form one whole. Vaclav Havel is putting forward his concept in the constitutional and legislative fields, and the government completes his model with a new concept of executive powers.

[Leschtina] Let us return to the division of the state. Your statement that, if Slovakia declared its sovereignty, Hungary could attempt to change the borders provoked an irritated reaction in Budapest.

[Calfa] I did not say anything like that. I simply drew attention to the fact that only the Czechoslovak-Hungarian borders are clear. Czechoslovak Ambassador Chmel explained this to the Hungarian prime minister and the whole thing calmed down. Members of the Hungarian press in Bratislava twisted my statement, the Hungarian side reacted to it, and their reaction got big publicity in Slovakia. I do not have to explain why. Speaking about the borders, the separatists do not say, for instance, that after Slovakia's separation new borders would be created in Moravia. They are constantly saying: We will declare an independent Slovakia, and then we will speak about whom we will sign international agreements with. What I ask is: Do they want to discuss a new state connection only after a completely new state form is established? With whom? With Poland, the Ukraine, Hungary, and Austria? Without wanting to offend any of these countries, I consider such a course of action to be scandalous and hazardous.

[Leschtina] Your colleague from the Civic Democratic Union-Public Against Violence movement, Jan Mlynarik, sees behind the separatist efforts an attempt by communist bureaucrats and State Security collaborators to create a more isolated Slovakia so that they can more easily implement their nationalist and socialist concepts. Do you agree with that statement?

[Calfa] The problem is more complicated. In the last elections in Slovakia, the Slovak National Party won 13 percent. It would be difficult to assume that only the

State Security agents voted for this party. However, I am alarmed by the strange harmony between some members of the Christian Democratic Party and parties that have a very strong nationalist element. There are genuine attempts to establish a different economic and political model in Slovakia from that in Bohemia. Evidence of this is, among other things, Prime Minister Carnogursky's statements directed against liberalism, Minister Oberhauser's statements on the economy, etc. On the other hand, I see—as does Mr. Mlynarik—a great danger in the fact that many former State Security members work in the Slovak State Administration. Particularly on the district level, the state apparatus is interconnected with directors of state enterprises and police corps. These mafias must be destroyed as soon as possible.

[Leschtina] Is that the reason that you and Minister Langos, as the only members of the government, voted in the Federal Assembly against the screening law?

[Calfa] Having broached this subject, I want to say that only a few people realize that the screening law means—as well as penalties—also a great pardon for many people to whom the screening law does not apply. However, I expect from the screening law that it will destroy precisely those political and economic links about which I spoke just now. The problem of mafias in Slovakia is so serious that, in the case of the screening law, I simply had to vote in accordance with my political club and against the opinion of the government over which I preside. It is precisely the fact that unshakable structures are governing the district levels that evokes the feeling of powerlessness in people. Slovaks are not much interested in the fact that this or that minister could be exposed as a former State Security collaborator. People hope that rather than hitting the top leaders whom they know from the television screen, the screening law will rightfully hit those who complicate their everyday lives and who induce fear.

[Leschtina] Are you not afraid? Some of your colleagues, labelled as federal Slovaks, have already shown that they are concerned about their security.

[Calfa] I am not that sensitive. I have a certain amount of knowledge and I can see that those who are driving Slovakia toward economic and social collapse on the wave of nationalism are absolute gamblers. Indeed, those people have no concept for saving Slovakia from the collapse that would inevitably follow after the breakup of economic links that have lasted for many years. The separatists only say: We will resolve all this later.... They are dangerous madmen whom we must oppose as decisively as possible.

Ivan Carnogursky Survives Confidence Vote

LD0212235291 Prague CSTK in English 2006 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Bratislava Dec 2 (CSTK)—The Slovak National Council (parliament) today voted (60 to 52, with 19

abstentions) against the proposal to dismiss Ivan Carnogursky from the post of first vice-chairman of the Slovak parliament on grounds of incompetence and conflict of interest.

The parliament this week is expected to consider 14 government bills, discuss the Slovak economy and the future constitutional setup of Czechoslovakia.

The deputies approved a government bill on establishing a Slovak constitutional court in Kosice (East Slovakia).

Slovak Finance Minister Jozef Danco said the Slovak and the Federal Governments still insist on passage of the 1992 budget as agreed on by the federal and republic finance ministers in Bratislava on November 20.

According to that agreement, 41.5 per cent of the budget will go to the Czech Republic, 23.5 per cent to the Slovak Republic and 35 per cent to the federation. The Czech Republic, however, is now demanding 43 per cent.

Moravian-Silesian Representatives Write Havel

LD2811064991 Prague Ceskoslovensky Rozhlas
Radio Network in Czech 1100 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] A delegation for the Movement for Autonomous Democracy-Society for Moravia and Silesia has left Brno for Prague to hand a letter from the Moravian and Silesian Council to President Vaclav Havel. Jaroslav Rektor reports on the telephone:

[Rektor] The letter has been signed by representatives of more than 10 political parties and movements active in Moravia and Silesia at the national and state levels. In the letter, they recap the historical context of the emergence of an autonomous land of Moravia and Silesia and its end in 1948. They further express the will of the majority of Moravians and Silesians to live in a state where the Moravian and Silesian land would have a status equal to that of Bohemia and Slovakia.

I quote from the conclusion of the letter: Esteemed Mr. President, please use your great constitutional power and the authority of your office to support the endorsement of the decree proposed by the Federal Assembly and the Czech National Council, which declares that the termination of the existence of the Moravian and Silesian lands on 1 January 1949 was an act consistent with a totalitarian regime. And, please ask the Federal Assembly to legalize Moravia and Silesia by the end of this year. As the governing political representatives lack the political will to resolve the issue of the state setup expediently, the Moravian and Silesian Council reserves the right to use all available means to achieve the objective it declared when it was set up.

That was a quote from the letter of the Moravian and Silesian Council, addressed to President of the Republic Vaclav Havel.

Diplomatic Ties With Russia, Ukraine Authorized*LD0312121691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1100 GMT 3 Dec 91***[Report by correspondent Jozsef Havel]**

[Text] The Hungarian foreign minister has authorized our country's diplomatic representatives in Moscow and Kiev to sign the protocol with Russia and with the Ukraine on the establishment of diplomatic relations as early as today, Janos Herman, foreign affairs spokesman, said at his press briefing today. As he added, the government of the Hungarian Republic has regarded Russia and the Ukraine as sovereign states for a long time and it has shaped its cooperation and contractual ties with the two countries in accordance with that. The Hungarian Government, the spokesman underlined, is ready to establish full diplomatic relations with the Russian Federation and to raise diplomatic ties to the highest level with the Ukraine.

Further, Janos Herman read out the Hungarian Foreign Ministry statement which stresses in connection with the sharpening of the anti-Magyar campaign in Serbia that the attacks against the Magyars in Vojvodina may not only hinder bilateral relations but they may fundamentally shake the system of maintaining ties and cooperation.

The spokesman also reported that the festive signing of the associate agreement between Hungary and the EC will take place on 16 December in Brussels. The Hungarian delegation will be headed by Jozsef Antall.

Jeszzenszky Interviewed on SFRY Conflict, Ukraine*LD0212223291 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Interview with Foreign Minister Geza Jeszzenszky by correspondent Jozsef Szabo in Budapest; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] **[Szabo]** The foreign minister has just returned from Venice, where the Hexagonale foreign ministers held talks on Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia is always an exciting and, sadly, dangerous topic. However, let me take the opportunity and ask Geza Jeszzenszky first about today's big topic, the Ukraine. There was a presidential election, a referendum on independence, and in all likelihood they voted for independence. Does the Hungarian foreign minister agree that if, I repeat, the referendum finally decides in favor of independence, can it really mean the end of the Soviet Union and personally, Gorbachev's career?

[Jeszzenszky] Well, it can hardly mean the end of Gorbachev's career, and the Soviet Union had already ceased to exist earlier, when several republics, republics of the former Soviet Union, signed [as heard] the Union of Sovereign States. Therefore I think no one expected a different result. It is true that it can also be regarded as a

sensation, and it is a sensation in a certain sense, because with this decision declaring the people's sovereignty it has been legalized, that is, it has become a sure fact that the Ukraine decides in this manner. However, this decision still does not necessarily mean that some kind of a total split from Russia will take place. This would be impossible, and not only economically. Tomorrow the ruble will continue to be the official currency. Whether it will be different one day I do not know. It is easily possible. But this in fact is the beginning of a process. Now it is indeed inevitable that the separation process begins, but I think that they are Siamese twins, and it is always very difficult to separate Siamese twins. I very much hope that this operation will not only be successful, but it will succeed in a way that the twins, who in fact have always loved each other very much, will continue their close relationship.

[Szabo] What place can an independent Ukraine have here in Europe?

[Jeszzenszky] Not only the Ukraine, but Russia, too, is a European state, at least a significant part of Russia, and this can particularly be said with regard to their culture. [passage omitted] I think that Russia, but perhaps we can include the Ukraine here, too—that a relationship can evolve with, let's say, the EC, Europe's economic and political core, like the one between Europe and the United States, or even the American continent, i.e., that cultural relations are obvious, political relations are very close; the CSCE implies this. And North America as well as the Soviet Union are also involved in the CSCE process, the Helsinki process. Therefore the Ukraine and Russia, as successor states, will, in all likelihood, remain involved. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] What is the Hungarian interest, and what is the world's interest? Is it that the Soviet Union remains together, or that there should be smaller republics?

[Jeszzenszky] I believe very much in the need for decentralization. It has never been possible to operate central empires successfully. Alexander the Great's empire did not survive a generation. At the same time, with the individual units, it is possible to bring about the operability of a large organization or maintain the cooperation thereof only if the regions have a relatively large degree of independence.

In the case of the European Community, which is increasingly a closely interlinked organization, from a certain viewpoint, taking place parallel to the process of integration is not one of disintegration, but one of decentralization. And this means not only that individual states remain and this can be planned on in the long-term too. For example, within Germany the role of the provinces is very big. In Spain, there again are provinces with autonomy. Indeed, even within France the role of the individual historical regions is increasing. This is so in Great Britain too.

So there is an idea that the Europe of the future will be not 40 or 50 states, but 150 regions, while in the meantime the states, the state frameworks, to be sure, remain.

I believe that the Hungarian interest and the interest of the peoples living on the territory of the former Soviet Union is that the individual units, whether they are republics or sovereign states, should be responsible for their own fate as much as possible, economically too. The given territory should have disposal of what it produces, of the quality thereof, because it was possible to cast responsibility on the uncertain, intangible centers. The bad decisions came from these, or at least it was possible to cast the blame for these decisions on them.

I believe the path of unfolding lies only in the Soviet Union not undergoing an atomization process, but in a sort of economic independence taking place, and in a genuine integration emerging in this.

In connection with Europe we usually say that only the states with sovereignty can voluntarily dismantle certain elements of sovereignty. I believe that this might be valid for the territory of the Soviet Union, too. Thus, states with sovereignty, through free decision, guided by rationality, might shape with one another relations, economic, trade, transport relations which are of a joint interest, and in which they renounce, by joint assent, the arrangement of certain matters for the sake of a form of common organization.

[Szabo] What impact might the events in the Ukraine have on our relations with Kiev and Moscow? Might recognition enter the picture?

[Jeszzenszky] It is not necessary to recognize the Ukraine. The Ukraine is a member state of the United Nations, so it is not merely a historical entity, but it exists legally. We have a consulate general in the Ukraine. So there are existing relations. Here in Budapest, the Ukraine has a designated representative, an envoy, within the Soviet Embassy. Here, there can be talk, at the most, of taking into consideration the declaration of sovereignty and the referendum, in accordance with the new situation, and of Hungary giving a new form to the relationship which in substance is in existence, and indeed is very intensive. And I believe that we must bring about this new form, precisely in awareness of the developments.

[Szabo] What impact might the independence of the Ukraine have on the situation of the Hungarians of sub-Carpathia? What I am thinking of is that, for example, in the case of Czechoslovakia, I have the feeling that the relationship of an independent Slovakia and the Hungarians who live there could be much more problematic than in the current situation.

[Jeszzenszky] I never like to engage in speculation, and at the moment this is what it would be in the case of Czechoslovakia. The Ukraine is a reality, just like Russia is a reality. So I add to the previous topic that while we might shape a higher-level relationship with the Ukraine

which is different in terms of form, I also consider it indispensable that alongside the Ukraine we want to maintain relations of the same level with Russia, as the Soviet Union's largest state, if you like, successor state.

Our relations with the Ukraine are justified by very many things, not merely by the fact that it is a fait accompli, but also because it is our largest neighbor, and also because there is a considerable, almost 200,000-strong Hungarian minority within it.

Sub-Carpathia is a patch of color, where, during the time of Stalinism, the Hungarians ended up in an extremely grave situation. It is known that at the end of 1944, at the beginning of 1945, about 40-50,000 people, practically the whole adult male population, were deported to mines. Very many perished. Therefore, the memory of a terrible past has haunted this area, but at the same time in the past years, and especially the most recent one to one-and-a-half years, there has been an enormous change. I personally have been convinced of this. In the recent past I visited not just Kiev and Lvov—Lemberg—but also Ungvar [Uzhgorod] as well as other settlements of Sub-Carpathia. The situation of the Hungarians there is, I must say, one of the best legally from among the groups of Hungarians living in the Carpathian Basin.

Alongside this, in this referendum a vote was taken on a special regional status; within this, in the case of the Hungarian-inhabited district in Beregszasz [Beregovo], the population again voted on the right of autonomy.

These are very encouraging signs, and what again is very important, the Hungarians living in Sub-Carpathia have a very good relationship with the local majority, whether we call them Ruthenians or Ukrainians. There are some people who believe there is a certain distinction between the two names.

The essence is that there are no tensions with the local population like those existing, regrettably, in other neighboring countries. So this too justifies, for us, the raising of the level of the previous relations and the maintenance of an intensive relationship with Ukraine.

[Szabo] We started this conversation with the talks of the foreign ministers of the Hexagonale held in Venice at the weekend but, contrary to the name, not six but five foreign ministers conferred. What do you regard as the essence of these talks? Altogether, is there any possibility for the sixth member, Yugoslavia—sorry for saying so—to stagger back somehow to the association, or the grouping?

[Jeszzenszky] Well, this is by no means an association, this is a regional economic, cultural, and transportation cooperation. We, at these talks—which was an informal meeting of just five foreign ministers who happen to be the members of the Hexagonale cooperation—we met to discuss how Austria, the next in turn, should step into the place of the nonfunctioning Yugoslav presidency because, it is clear, not only the future of Yugoslavia is in

question, but the Hexagonale can not operate this way. However, it is a firm intention of the participating states that the cooperation should continue, that this terrible war should not cause a shock or make trouble, because this is in the interest of Yugoslavia, of the peoples, republics of Yugoslavia. So, we were looking for what has to be done in this situation. And it was raised that, at a certain point, we would invite not only one representative of Yugoslavia, but more than one, the representatives of the republics. But, in the end, we made a decision that, since we were talking about republics in conflict with one another, this would not promote a constructive atmosphere.

However, in this way, we turned to the participants of the conflict jointly so that they could look at the future. This could be one type of stimulation for ceasing hostilities, for finding the way to a solution by negotiations, because according to our information, not only two republics have formally indicated that they would like to continue the cooperation, but I assume that the other republics would like it as well. That is to say, those who are ready and wish to continue the cooperation of the Hexagonale, that is to say, the cooperation of this territory, the cooperation of Central Europe, the territory stretching from the Baltics to the Adriatic should do it. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] [passage indistinct]

[Jeszenszky] [passage indistinct]

[Szabo] The issue of possible recognition of Slovenia and Croatia was raised in Venice. As far as I know, the statement of the Italian foreign minister was interpreted in different ways.

[Jeszenszky] Yes, the issue of recognition was raised and he talked about it at the press briefing as well, but as a possibility which is on the agenda in the European Community. But it depends to a great extent on the fate of the different initiatives, the peace conference in The Hague, the peace mission. So, I have to say that this is a matter for the following weeks. And the Hexagonale itself also emphasized that this is not only about involving the two republics or continuing the cooperation, just as in the case of recognition. [passage omitted] Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia—they have already indicated their claim for independence in different ways.

[Szabo] Could bringing forward recognition [of Slovenia and Croatia] facilitate a settlement of the conflict in Yugoslavia, or is it the reverse, that a hasty recognition would, rather, worsen the situation?

[Jeszenszky] Properly speaking, this is the subject of debate in the European Community. This is not a debate of principle, and for this reason an easily resolvable debate, because everyone wants the same. Everyone wants peace. Everyone wants the right to self-determination to prevail; human rights and minority rights should be respected. For this reason, here is the framework for a solution. For those who accept these

principles negotiations are possible, support is possible, they can be spared the impact of the sanctions. The sole question of debate is only over whether recognition would promote a solution.

Well, I previously, for some time, thought that recognition would provide a chance for accelerating a solution, but I must say that from a certain viewpoint the events, unfortunately, vindicated those who urged recognition. For lack of recognition, instead of getting closer to a solution, an increasingly grave, increasingly bloody, increasingly barbaric war has developed.

Therefore, the other solution logically offers itself, that one could scarcely make it worse. Or rather, there are some who feel that it would be possible to make it worse, but the war that is taking place is such that I do not believe that it could be worse. In what manner would it be worse?

However, by recognition we would create a clear situation for everyone, thus for the inhabitants of Serbia, for the forces in Serbia, who are not inconceivable, who want peace and who disapprove of this war policy. And there are extreme forces in, say, Croatia. In a very praiseworthy manner, President Tudjman had the courage to detain the leader of the party at whose activity many people in Europe rightly had raised their eyebrows.

Thus, I believe this process could promote it, because in that case they would face one another as equal partners at the negotiating table, and it would not be the participants in the conflict who faced one another in the field of combat. It would become clear that it is necessary to come to agreement with one another, because, let us say, the international community recognizes those who accept the principles laid down in the Helsinki CSCE process, and also in the UN Charter.

[Szabo] If I interpret your words correctly you are for recognition, but I think that Hungarian recognition can not precede recognition by the European Community or the Western European countries.

[Jeszenszky] Yes, well, we try to make this a wide-ranging process and I think that in a way, it is also in the interest of Serbia, for today, the world practically wants nothing to do with Yugoslavia, for it is quite unequivocal that there is an illegitimate government presidium there. The Yugoslav Government—well, we have read that it was dismissed and now it still exists. So I myself do not know whether Foreign Minister Loncar receives my messages. Not long ago I sent him a message. This is such an uncertain situation, which is not in the interest of the Serbian people, and Serbia also needs peace and economic relations. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] How did the foreign ministers view any danger to Hungary? Simultaneously with Venice, the Serbian foreign minister talked about Hungarian interventions, and that foreign mercenaries are being trained in Hungary.

[Jeszenszky] Well, it is interesting that the Serbian foreign minister said such things prior to his arrival in Hungary. I asked him about this here, in this room, and he, so to speak, turned a deaf ear. He did not reply. So with this, he in fact, acknowledged that he is unable to prove it with concrete evidence. Since then they have come up with even more impossible and fantastic allegations. [passage omitted]

The Serbian foreign minister said after his return that he sees that Hungary wants to have good relations with Serbia. Well, this kind of propaganda statement does not serve good relations. As for training camps for mercenaries, well, there is hardly another state which would be more open than Hungary, here in the former communist block, including Yugoslavia also. [passage omitted]

At the same time I have to say that I am rather worried about the excesses committed by the irregular armed units in Yugoslavia, both within and outside the territory of Serbia. And I also know that the Hungarians of Vojvodina are rightly worried about the guardsmen whose training is indeed under way in Serbia. I think nobody refutes that these kind of training camps do exist in Serbia, where, I am afraid, trigger-happy young men, who do not even know what they are doing half the time, are being armed and trained in the name of some sort of national goals. Well, this is the real issue which gives reason for worry. We did not give a lot of publicity to this, but I have to say that it would be good if the world would take notice, for this is the real danger, not the one about which my Serb colleague talked the other day in Subotia.

[Szabo] Well, anyway, Hungarian-Serbian relations are bad, but Hungarian-Romanian relations are not any better. In the next few days a parliamentary delegation will hold talks in Bucharest. Can we expect any concrete results from these talks?

[Jeszenszky] Well, dialogue always has to be maintained on a certain level. Unfortunately, it can not be said that Romanian-Hungarian relations are too hot. I always said, and still maintain that it does not rest with us. [passage omitted] I consider it very important to let Romanian society know that neither the Hungarian people, nor the Hungarian Government or opposition are their enemies, but would like to be their friends and would like the relations to change.

[Szabo] I think that Hungarian foreign politics in its entirety is one of the success stories of the government. [passage omitted]

[Jeszenszky] Yes, of course, independence. There are no foreign troops in Hungary for the first time in 450 years.

[Szabo] Yes, it is so. But perhaps exactly because of all this success the question arises that there is a lot of talk at the moment about the internal reorganization of the Foreign Ministry. There seems to be a controversy here, for if this is a success story, why is there need for it to be reorganized?

[Jeszenszky] There is no organization which can not operate even better. Therefore, I think it would have been a lot more fortunate if the press would have waited for the announcement, which would have been made in a short time, as to what sort of transformation will take place in the Foreign Ministry and what sort of personnel changes will be implemented.

[Szabo] What is the strategic aim of this reorganization?

[Jeszenszky] This has been taking place for weeks, and I would like to say with special emphasis that no concentrated government strategy of any kind stands behind it. We have no intention whatsoever to drive the government officials to a party line, i.e. to bring in party members. I am still convinced that in this Foreign Ministry there are a lot more members or supporters of other parties compared with the Hungarian Democratic Forum or the government coalition. [passage omitted]

I would, however, like to stress here that the priorities and the tasks of Hungarian foreign policy have in fact changed. No one would have thought one-and-a-half years ago that we would have such an intensive relationship with Europe, Western Europe, the EC and NATO. No Hexagonale or Visegrad trilateral cooperation existed then. [passage omitted]

[Szabo] Are you, as minister, satisfied with your colleagues?

[Jeszenszky] You were complimentary enough to give Hungarian foreign policy a good mark. This foreign policy is really being made in the government and being formed by politicians. [passage omitted]

Serbian Accusation of Mercenary Training Rejected

LD0212175891 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1700 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Hungary resolutely rejects the accusations of the Serb foreign minister, according to which foreign mercenaries are being trained in the country. Foreign affairs spokesman Janos Herman emphasized that the Serb allegations have never been proved by any evidence so far. Hungary considers the frequent accusations regrettable, for they damage the relations of the two countries and the two peoples. Budapest is ready to maintain the Hungarian-Serb dialogue in the future too, and it will do anything in order to secure peace in Yugoslavia.

Deadline Imposed on CSFR Over Bos Dam Dispute

LD0212215891 Budapest MTI in English 2116 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 2 (MTI)—Hungary expects Czechoslovakia to decide in ten days if they will suspend works underway in Slovakia for constructing the Bos-Gabcikovo hydro-electric dam while investigation by a

joint committee [what] is going on. If they refuse, Hungary may cancel their inter-state agreement, Hungarian Minister Without Portfolio Ferenc Madl said to the press after talks today.

As long as the work continues by Czechoslovakia, Hungary cannot accept the proposal to set up a joint committee said Madl, who heads the Hungarian delegation. If the countries can break the deadlock, the committee could begin exploring alternatives to utilize the existing hydro-electric dam system.

"If we agreed to suspend the work and Hungary decided next year the dam system was unusable," Slovak Prime Minister Jan Carnogursky argues, "we would have to wait a year before operating the dam." This, he says, is something his country cannot afford.

According to Czechoslovakia, Hungary already broke the agreement by shutting down the construction in Nagymaros. Czechoslovakia wants to establish the joint committee but rejects halting the work as a precondition, Carnogursky said.

Horn Evaluates Romanian Ties, Previews Visit

LD0112214691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 0730 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Interview with Gyula Horn, chairman of the Hungarian Socialist Party, by Zoltan Csaki in Budapest; date not given—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Horn] When the delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Romanian Parliament and Senate, under the leadership of Chairman Corneliu Manescu, was in Hungary this spring, we said that a fundamental condition for improvement in Hungarian-Romanian relations is that they should guarantee the rights of the Magyar minority living in Transylvania, in Romania. This is not just a Hungarian request. It accords with the international obligations which Romania, as a signatory, has undertaken. We cannot separate the issue of bilateral relations from the fate of Magyardom in Transylvania, nor can we in the future.

We received very strong criticism from certain members of the Romanian delegation for these comments last spring—so much so that there were some who said that if we continue to urge this and be firm on these views, then Hungarian-Romanian relations can never be good. This is not so. It is a fundamental issue.

We also agreed last spring that if any serious problem arises, then we should contact each other immediately. I am very sorry—and I said this most recently when the Romanian-Hungarian friendship society delegation was here—for there is such a society in the parliament, the Romanian National Assembly.... [changes thought] It would have been good—for example, in the case of Harghita and Covasna counties and that ominous report they put together in which there are very strong accusations in general against politicians and the Hungarian

Republic—if the delegations of the Foreign Affairs Committees of the two parliaments had sat down and tried, prior to the start of any propaganda campaign, to clarify these matters.

I emphasize that our fundamental obligation is, if any problem arises, to try and hold talks, naturally without setting any kind of conditions. However, it is my opinion that relations between two neighboring countries cannot be good if, with regard to the nationalities living there, a policy is conducted that is generally known to be bad—and not just for years, but for decades.

[Csaki] Can any kind of progress be expected at these talks? [passage omitted]

[Horn] [passage omitted] According to the program, our delegation will have meetings with everyone who plays an important role in Romania. This is a six-party delegation of the Foreign Affairs Committee, so we will have talks with the prime minister, the Romanian head of state Iliescu, and with almost everyone else. Naturally, the question arises as to whether this trip can yield results. There is always a risk. On the one hand that we will not manage to reach agreement. On the other, if we do reach agreement, then there is no guarantee that they will realize the agreements.

[Csaki] What is the minimum you would call a result?

[Horn] In my opinion, the minimum agreement—without thinking about written agreements, for this is primarily the task of governments, not the parliament—would be that we should bring the standpoints closer in open questions, disputed problems, and disputed issues that cause tension in Hungarian-Romanian relations. Also, we should be able to reach some kind of agreement verbally, an agreement on a method of action by which in the future they consult with us on anything that is a significant question, before a decision is made in the Romanian Parliament. This is what I would consider minimal and the greatest result.

Antall Comments on Talks With Bulgaria's Ganev

LD0312010991 Budapest MTI in English 1907 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 2 (MTI)—There are no debated issues between Bulgaria and Hungary and both countries are working to build good relations under the new conditions, Hungarian Prime Minister Jozsef Antall and Bulgarian Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Stojan Ganev agreed at talks today.

Since its election victory, the Bulgarian Alliance of Democratic Forces has been striving to integrate national and ethnic minorities into society and to develop a market economy, Ganev said. Bulgaria hopes its foreign policies will contribute to European stability through actively working in the Balkan region, Ganev said.

Hungary supports Bulgaria's endeavours to join European integrational organizations and its efforts towards democratization and a switch to market economy, Antall said. Respect for minority rights will enhance Bulgaria's international reputation and will help the country integrate into European organizations, he told Ganev. Antall accepted an invitation to visit Bulgaria.

Oil Deliveries From USSR 'Adequate' for 1991

LD3011001491 Budapest MTI in English 1756 GMT
27 Nov 91

[Text] Budapest, November 27 (MTI)—Oil delivery from the Soviet Union to Hungary continues to go free from hitches, leaving Hungary with an adequate oil supply. However it is uncertain whether there will be sufficient oil for the first quarter of next year, Hungarian Oil Co. (HOC) officials told newsmen today.

In November, half a million tonnes of Soviet oil were imported through the friendship pipeline and a similar amount is expected next month. HOC hopes the Adriatic pipeline between the Adriatic Sea and Hungary, closed because of the Yugoslav civil [war], may be reopened. The company, however, is prepared to procure oil through other channels.

Hungary's crude oil reserves are sufficient for two weeks and refined products for 40 days. From 1 January 1992 the maximum lead content of 92-octane and 98-octane petrols will be 0.15 gram/litre, conforming to European standards. (A year ago, the maximum lead content was three times as high.) Sulphuric content will be maximized at 0.05 per cent.

In another development to combat air pollution, petrol stations in Budapest and vicinity are to start selling 91-octane, lead-free "city-petrol" next year.

Foreign Ministry State Secretary Somogyi Resigns

LD0312012891 Budapest MTI in English 1922 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 2 (MTI)—Hungarian Foreign Ministry State Secretary Ferenc Somogyi's resignation was accepted by Prime Minister Antall, the prime minister's press office said today. Antall had proposed Somogyi's release to Hungarian President Arpad Goncz. Simultaneously, Antall proposed current international economic relations state secretary, Janos Martonyi, replace Somogyi. The prime minister requested parliament Speaker Gyorgy Szabad call on the foreign affairs committee to hold a hearing for Martonyi.

Opposition Protests Central Bank Reshuffle

LD0212215491 Budapest MTI in English 2100 GMT
2 Dec 91

[Text] Budapest, December 2 (MTI)—Words from the Hungarian prime minister today linked the recent

release of now-former National Bank of Hungary (NBH) President Gyorgy Suranyi with his signing of the "Democratic Charter" this September. Suranyi's signing the Democratic Charter (a document put forth this September which disagreed with aspects of how democratic transformation has taken place in Hungary and called for a "true democracy") and holding the post of NBH president are incompatible, Antall said.

According to opposition MPs [members of parliament] during heated debate in parliament today, Antall's step contradicts to the spirit of the new banking law and will provoke fears in society.

Responding to the protests, Antall said Suranyi's release is not an attempt at replacement but merely the need to appoint new central bank leaders in accord with the new banking law. However, as Antall pointed out, it is his responsibility to suggest a new candidate for the post. Adding that the NBH president, despite his independence, must follow the government line.

Opposition MPs protested Prime Minister Jozsef Antall citing political reasons in justifying his decision.

In another development, parliament failed to pass a resolution on the 1996 World Expo bill today. The bill was supported by the economic committee, the environmental protection committee and the constitutional committee. The budgetary committee will only reveal its position after all amendments to the bill have been submitted. A second discussion of the bill is to continue tomorrow.

Raffay, Annus View Defense Budget, Security Policy

LD0112120491 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 1730 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Interview with Antal Annus and Ernoe Raffay, Defense Ministry state secretaries, by unidentified correspondent in Budapest on 27 November; from the "Extra" program—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Correspondent] According to certain experts, the technical standards of the Hungarian Army, even in the mildest of terms, corresponds to the standards of the early 1980s. In the studio are the political and administrative state secretaries of the portfolio, Antal Annus and Ernoe Raffay. [passage omitted]

Some experts may very well ask, is it worth investing any money at all into an Army like this? Which one of you wishes to start? Antal Annus?

[Annus] I think that the question has to be asked also from a different angle. Thus, is there a need for an army in Hungary? And if the answer is yes, then we have to decide what sort of army we need. [passage omitted] In view of that, there are no financial resources at the moment, and not even in the foreseeable future, to create a smaller but more modern army in Hungary. It is

obvious that this Army has to be made suitable for the country's independent defense by regrouping internal resources. [passage omitted] You said that our equipment is of 1980s standards. I would say that the majority is on the technical level of the 1960s. Well, it is obvious that the methodical and planned renewal of this equipment should be carried out. There is no money for this. Therefore, with plenty of thoughts, the present equipment has to be kept operational and more should be spent on repair and maintenance.

[Raffay] Let me add a few sentences. Let us look at a few figures. In 1986, five years ago, 3.7 percent of the national GDP was given to Hungary's defense budget. In the next year, that is in 1992, 1.73 percent of the GDP will be given to the defense force, according to our proposals. I hope that this 59.65 billion forints will be there, for this constitutes the 1.73 percent. I think we would all be very pleased in the Defense Ministry and in the General Staff if we could have the level of the 1980s.

Going back to the matter of the armored transport combat vehicles, this is precisely the area where the situation is the worst. Let me touch on the current situation of the Hungarian Army, from the viewpoint of security policy. [passage omitted] When the Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, and Soviet troops left Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and parts of Germany, and finally, due to the disintegrating Soviet Union, an extremely unstable security policy situation evolved in the Eastern European region. If we look at Hungary in this situation, we add the opinion of our experts who say that in the next two to five years, and even in our greater neighborhood, some sort of security policy problems, or God forbid, even military clashes will also occur. Then I have to say what you have already said, that the situation—in connection with the armored transport combat vehicles—is tragic, but not only in connection with them. This is about the defense of Hungary. [passage omitted]

[Annus] We envisage that, at least in these present years, most of all, Hungarian foreign politics has to bring the country into a situation that armed conflicts should not occur on any account. And at the same time, the stand of the Defense Cabinet, which incidentally is the same as that of the government or the majority of the government, is that parallel with this, tidying of the Hungarian Armed Forces has to be started. If the technical level in general is to deteriorate further for a few more years, than after a time, developing the technical standards of the Army will become hopeless.

[Correspondent] We, of course, know that while Hungary belonged to the Warsaw Pact we received arms from the Soviet Union. It was also common knowledge, even at the time, that their armament was not modern even then, since they gave us the leftovers. You said that we cannot overcome this situation very easily. Have you any figures as to what sort of damage and extra costs this causes? I am informed that the Soviet Union sells not only oil but also the spare parts that are the necessary military replacements for Western currency?

[Annus] Yes, you are correctly informed. The Soviet Union sells it for dollars and we can already work practically with one to three or three and a half price multipliers, unfortunately. It is obvious that for the same amount of money, we can only obtain one-third or slightly less than one-third than earlier. I would also like to point out that we were not given this equipment, but the country bought them at the time. It followed a particular process. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Could we obtain modern Western arms in quantities with the money which is allocated for buying spare parts, which would create a basis or starting point for a modern Hungarian Army with suitable weapons to fulfill its task?

[Annus] It is obvious that even at a later day, this can be envisaged gradually. Modern equipment is extremely expensive and they would not be able to make a quantitative difference by their higher quality which would solve our basic problems at the moment. It is based on concrete calculations on how big an armed force the country needs. So, practically, next year, we are talking about an army of 100,000. It is obvious that when making the calculations, the capacity of the present equipment system has to be taken as a basis. To change this situation with a system of equipment of higher quality but less in quantity, is simply not feasible; that is, to change the lot is impossible. To carry out the change gradually is only possible if the money is there to start it all. However, the old has to be kept operational for there can not be a pause. We can not say that we will close down the country's defense for two or three years while we reorganize the Army. Therefore, our first and most important goal for 1992 is, again, that the battle readiness of this Army should be guaranteed in all circumstances.

[Correspondent] Are there concrete negotiations under way about Mirages and F-15s? What is the German connection like, the French one? Is there a link between our present talk and Colonel General Deak's U.S. visit?

[Raffay] It is an extraordinarily important and serious issue and negotiations started last year before everything—the German link to which you referred and in the way of which—it must be said very frankly—there are very serious difficulties in the wake of the Vienna negotiations and the signing of the Paris Charter. However, we keep alive not only the German connection but the U.S. one, the French, the British, and all—if I may give an example. The first weekend in December, U.S. Defense Secretary Dick Cheney will visit Hungary and a committee to work out what we will present to Secretary Cheney has been formed. It is our very definite intention to have some kind of financial arrangement vis-a-vis the United States, ie. we would purchase, and within the framework of a very favorable economic construction we should be able to start—I agree with Lieutenant General

Annus—the change of the Army's armament which will be done gradually. This must be done all the more because—if I am permitted to give another figure—the percentage ratio between the Army's development and maintenance in 1986 was 40 to 60 whereas now the ratio is 9 to 91 percent. This is an impossible situation. Precisely because of this, very serious negotiations are taking place vis-a-vis the start of the Army's rearmament. First of all, we have formulated priorities. The air force and air defense are most important. The Yugoslav situation, the Yugoslav crisis, the flights into Hungarian airspace, too, show this.

[Correspondent] If indeed this is the ratio between maintenance and development, and meanwhile, within the framework of an advantageous treaty, U.S. military technology comes to Hungary—well, I think that from this money I am sure will not be paid or they cannot pay from this. [as heard] Through what channels is money streaming into the Hungarian Army or if possible, must one prepare for the defense by keeping the budget under constant pressure and pumping it for money?

[Annus] The defense must protect the country, under any circumstances. On the other hand, the Yugoslav situation shows that by the end of this year our measures merely vis-a-vis the Yugoslav crisis will cost 1.3 billion forints and may cost two billion next year. The defense cannot pay out this 59.65 billion forints. The government's National Security Cabinet discussed this issue. There is no alternative in this situation but that the Yugoslav crisis must be financed from government reserves outside the budget. With regard to the budget, we plan to use special government funds to improve the 91-9 ratio.

[Correspondent] [words indistinct]

[Raffay] We did not think that because of this we should raise taxes. We will not receive special money from this. [passage omitted] However, we are thinking of components production, higher purchase arrangements, the kind of construction with which this slow change of armaments can start to exist. Just now these would cost relatively little and we can prolong payment in some way. There is no other means. [passage omitted]

[Annus] In the 1992 budget, we could basically set only the task of making the Army ready for battle and having its equipment workable, and that we should be able to solve the needed adjustment change in this Army which decreases to 100,000 alongside the priority enjoyed by aircraft and air defense. We are unable to solve significant issues. One is that the standard living conditions of staff continues to worsen, the other is that we are unable to commence the modernization of the Army while the present state of affairs at our southern borders which may last have placed further burdens on the budget. This is not contained by the draft. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] The country's defense capability, the Yugoslav crisis, the state of the region are such a tax, quote, unquote, which the defense establishment can place any time on the table of the administration, the parliament, the budget, etc. Where is the point where it turns into blackmail? [passage omitted]

[Raffay] Then there are voices, for example, one deputy says that whether Barcs is bombed or not the Army does not get more money. This is an extraordinarily simplifying stand which ultimately speaks against Hungary and the Magyars and has been said by a parliamentary deputy. Naturally, we cannot agree with this. It is an impossible situation, for we are talking about the fate of Hungary, the country's security issues. [passage omitted]

Government Decision To Recognize Ukraine Reported*LD0212165391 Warsaw PAP in English 1606 GMT
2 Dec 91*

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 2—The Polish Government decided to recognize the Ukraine as a state on December 2 and establish diplomatic relations with it, Government Press Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski announced on Monday.

"Poland sees the independent Ukraine as a partner of close and versatile good-neighbourly relations," reads a related statement issued by the Council of Ministers.

"The Polish Government is confident that the gaining of independence by the Ukraine will have a favourable influence on the deepening of cooperation between both states to the benefit of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples, their neighbours and entire Europe," the government stated.

Government Statement Published*LD0212175491 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1700 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Statement published by the Council of Ministers on 2 December on the recognition of the Ukraine]

[Text] Taking into consideration the good state and intensity of Polish-Ukrainian relations and the results of the referendum of 1 December of this year on Ukrainian independence, the government of the Polish Republic recognizes the Ukraine as a state and resolves to establish diplomatic relations with it.

The government of the Polish Republic expresses the conviction that the Ukraine will provide a significant contribution to the construction of the system of security and cooperation on our continent, on the basis of international law and principles of CSCE. In particular, the government of the Polish Republic expresses the conviction that the Ukraine will respect the obligations resulting from the treaty on conventional armed forces in Europe and other obligations concerning disarmament—in particular, resulting from the START agreement—and that the Ukraine will make it possible for such obligations to be realized.

The government of the Polish Republic hopes that the Ukraine will join the treaty on nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. The Polish Government also expresses the hope that, when creating its own armed forces, the Ukraine will take into consideration the trend to reduce the armed forces that is at present dominant in Europe.

Poland sees in the independent Ukraine a partner for close and universal good-neighborly relations.

Foreign Ministry Comments*LD0212211391 Warsaw PAP in English 2019 GMT
2 Dec 91*

[Excerpts] Warsaw, Dec. 2—Poland is the first state to recognize the independence of the Ukraine and declare will to establish diplomatic relations with it. The decision on the move was taken by the Polish Government on Monday. [passage omitted]

Commenting on the government's decision, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the creation of the independent Ukrainian state, welcomed by Poland, was of great significance from the point of view of the European system of security and cooperation.

The ministry stressed that Poland accepted the final character of the borders between the two states and expected the same approach on the Ukrainian side.

"We also expect the further favourable modelling of conditions for the development of national minorities, the Polish one in the Ukraine and the Ukrainian one in Poland, in tune with the standards practiced in Europe, with the CSCE settlements in particular. Poland expects that our friendly, good-neighbourly relations will be reflected in an inter-state treaty in near future," the ministry stated.

"Poland was the first state to accredit an official representative of the Ukraine on its territory. The independent Ukraine has in Poland a neighbour open to all forms of cooperation," spokesman for the Foreign Ministry Grzegorz Dziemidowicz said.

He recalled that as a result of contacts between the two countries the Polish-Ukrainian declaration on mutual relations and trade agreements had been signed last year, a consular agreement established and special government emissaries appointed by both nations.

Restructuring of Trade Links With Ukraine Planned*LD0312011491 Warsaw PAP in English 1925 GMT
2 Dec 91*

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 2—The Polish-Ukrainian trade agreement is adapting our mutual relations to new conditions, stated Mikolaj Oniszcuk from the Ministry of Foreign Economic relations on Monday.

The recently signed agreement stipulates a restructuring of the hitherto prevailing system of cooperation, introducing above all the settling of accounts at current world prices. The cooperation will be organised by enterprises and trading firms themselves.

Poland and the Ukraine have each given each other the most favoured nation status. "We are attaching special importance to the development of economic cooperation between the border regions", said Oniszcuk.

In a few days in Warsaw talks concerning trade between the two countries will take place. It is expected that preference will be given to hard currency cash deals. This does not exclude other forms of trade such as hard currency clearing on priority goods and barter. The development of trade dealings should lead to closer links between enterprises like joint-ventures and common chambers of commerce.

Agreement Reached on Transit of Soviet Troops

LD2911184391 Warsaw PAP in English 2219 GMT
27 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 27—The text of an agreement on the transit through Poland of Soviet troops being pulled out from Germany was reached by the Polish and Soviet negotiators during the 13th round of negotiations held in Warsaw November 26 and 27.

As for the troops being withdrawn from Poland, the present round dealt mostly with financial issues concerning the property used by the Soviets in Poland and problems of transportation.

The Polish delegation expressed readiness to start settling accounts for Soviet fixed assets to be left in Poland, simultaneously with Polish claims for damages, above all for ecological losses.

Under the agreement reached during the previous, 12th round in Moscow, all Soviet troops will be completely pulled out from Poland by November 15, 1992. The 14th round of talks is scheduled for the first half of January next year, to be preceded by talks of teams of experts.

Skubiszewski Discusses State of European Relations

PM2911160491 Paris LE FIGARO in French
28 Nov 91 p 6

[Interview with Foreign Minister Krzysztof Skubiszewski by Xavier Gautier in Strasbourg; date not given]

[Text] [Gautier] You have just signed the document that marks Poland's accession to the Council of Europe, having already reached an association agreement with the EC. Is this the first step toward EC membership?

[Skubiszewski] Our entry into the European institutions that were hitherto exclusively Western organizations is the result of our policy of rapprochement with the Western countries since the change of regime in Warsaw just over two years ago. It is also Europe's response to—in tribute to—a certain degree of success in our transformations. But our strategic objective is Poland's acceptance as a full EC member.

[Gautier] When?

[Skubiszewski] I think that negotiations will begin soon. But we must be realistic. This plan will require patience,

as well as objective changes, and particularly the de-restriction and restructuring of our economy. It should also be pointed out that talks on accession usually last several years. My hope is that this membership can take place toward the end of the decade.

[Gautier] What is your view, as a European, on the 9-10 December Maastricht summit?

[Skubiszewski] For us, this great summit represents a logical evolution of the EC's integration. We are outside this process, but we welcome this trend toward European unification which we sought for Poland for so long.

[Gautier] Is the civil war in Yugoslavia not the real test of this common foreign policy that the Maastricht summit is due to discuss?

[Skubiszewski] This topic cannot be avoided. In the short term, progress will be made within the context of the plan formulated in The Hague. Eventually, enough states will be found to recognize Croatia. If nothing has happened yet, it is less because of the Twelve than because of the difficulties inherent to the Yugoslav situation. Recognition must be a European decision. But it is a matter of time.

[Gautier] If nothing happens, will the Warsaw government take the initiative to recognize the secessionist republics of Slovenia and Croatia?

[Skubiszewski] Poland does not want to set itself apart. But it is one of the states considering this possibility. We give priority to the process of consultation among the Twelve, within the context of the conference at The Hague. There will be no isolated initiative, because there is not what Yugoslav Foreign Minister Budimir Loncar called in New York an "alternative situation for Yugoslavia."

[Gautier] What is Poland's policy with regard to its Soviet neighbor?

[Skubiszewski] Any involvement on our part in Soviet events is out of the question. We are a medium-sized country, so our capacity for action is minimal. At the same time, it is necessary to draw conclusions from the new situation in the Soviet Union.

[Gautier] Kalinigrad—which, under the name of Koenigsberg, was a great German city at the time when Eastern Prussia was under Berlin—is now geographically cut off from Russia by Lithuania. Insofar as this city is very close to your borders, what statute would Poland prefer for Kalinigrad?

[Skubiszewski] The Polish position on the former Koenigsberg is quite clear. As far as we are concerned, this territory belongs to Russia. The position of the republics in the future union has certainly not been settled yet, but we accept the status quo. It would be unreasonable to support fantastic plans to turn Kalinigrad into a fourth Baltic country.

[Gautier] The Ukraine is also a neighbor of yours. This newly independent republic intends to equip itself with a particularly powerful army, since there are over 50 million Ukrainians. Does that worry you?

[Skubiszewski] No, not at all. We were the pioneers in relations at two different levels. While maintaining our relations with the USSR, we made a rapprochement with the Ukraine, Belorussia, and the Baltic countries back in summer 1990. So when a number of republics proclaimed their sovereignty within the framework of the Soviet Union, we were able to sign an agreement in October 1990. They were the Ukraine and Soviet Russia.

[Gautier] A year after Bonn's recognition of the Oder-Neisse line as the border between Poland and Germany, what is the status of your relations with the FRG?

[Skubiszewski] The experience of Franco-German rapprochement cannot be transposed to the East because of our respective countries' different histories. But we do intend to achieve a French-style rapprochement with Germany. It is a matter of maintaining our independence from Germany, which will be difficult, because we do not have France's strength. But I think that German-Polish cooperation is now on the right road.

[Gautier] Is the time ripe to turn Silesia—the Polish province that was German territory until 1945—into a Euro-region such as the Sarre-Luxembourg-Lorraine triangle?

[Skubiszewski] It is too soon to talk about this. It is not an issue that arises in our domestic or foreign policy. I must say that there are chiefly Poles in Silesia. I am not talking about the German minority, who enjoy some protectors abroad....

[Gautier] In Germany?

[Skubiszewski] Yes, in Germany. But the status of our relations with Bonn is good, as far as the German minority are concerned. In this regard, the German-Polish agreement was established on the basis of European criteria for minorities, which were set by the 1990 Copenhagen agreement and the 1991 Geneva agreement. What we have rejected is the idea that the German minority could enjoy special treatment. I am among those who reject any territorial autonomy for Poles of German origin.

[Gautier] How, specifically, is your rapprochement with Germany progressing?

[Skubiszewski] There is already initial regional cooperation between the laender of the former GDR and the territories of Western Poland. We are cooperating particularly in the field of transport and the environment in the triangle formed by northern Bohemia, lower Silesia, and the Lusace region.

[Gautier] Two months ago President Havel expressed his anxiety about a situation in which the Western countries

would throw Czechoslovakia onto "the garbage heap of Europe." Do you share his fears?

[Skubiszewski] No. I am much more optimistic than President Havel.

[Gautier] He warned that the chaos that then threatened to take hold in the new democracies of central Europe would be damaging to European unity.

[Skubiszewski] If that did happen, yes, it would be a danger. But the West knows that it is in its interest to build a Europe of which we would be part. A united Europe will be stronger if it enjoys the contribution of the central European countries.

Walesa, NSZZ Solidarity View Small Constitution

LD0212172291 Warsaw Radio Warszawa Network
in Polish 1500 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Excerpt] The first parliamentary floor group that President Lech Walesa held consultations with on his draft small constitution was the NSZZ [Independent Self-Governing Trade Union] Solidarity floor group. The legislative faults and doubts as to its effects were discussed for two hours; namely, an excessive strengthening of the executive was feared. At the end of the meeting the president said:

[Begin Walesa recording] We won't sort anything out by shouting, requesting, or with good intentions, only by specific measures that somebody supports and is responsible for. I want us to understand that historical responsibility for democracy, for the state, would be frightfully difficult in a situation where there were scandals and a lack of laws, so that we do that calmly and as well as possible, and our ambitions, presidential ambitions, are put away because the interest of the country is the greatest ambition. Our children are going to feel the effects of our work themselves, so that they don't have to escape—as was proposed to us—so they stay in Poland and are pleased with their parents for having prepared the conditions for them. [applause] [end recording] [passage omitted]

Walesa Remarks Reported

LD0212210191 Warsaw TVP Television Network
in Polish 1852 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Remarks by President Lech Walesa at a meeting with the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union parliamentary floor group in Warsaw on 2 December—recorded]

[Text] [Walesa] Everyone generally repeats that practically no one rules in Poland, or if one does rule, then he rules badly. A duty rests upon us to exchange this victory for results, so that these results can really bring benefits to society, so that one could say that things are improving. Hence, in connection with this, I put forward an initiative to improve the efficiency of governing. I am

convinced and—whether you like it or not—I simply can tell you that if we do not let the government govern, if we are not efficient and resolute, then we will be stuck, and society will continue to be dissatisfied with us. There is one solution. I can see one way out—in efficient governing. But this efficient governing cannot wreck democracy or set itself against democracy. And thus, there must be in the Parliament... the Parliament must have an influence on the shape of Poland, on the acceptance of a program for putting laws in order, but those laws that have been passed or regulations that have been accepted must be implemented in a dictatorial manner by the government and other agencies, but especially by the government.

I ask you to consider all this and to press all others, using your votes and your convictions. As creators and implementors of the August ideals, we think that the only solution for Poland today is in giving chances for efficient governing, but for such chances that will not allow the system to be changed into dictatorship, such chances that will not destroy the achievements of the democracy that we have today. If we want to win and to cope with tasks, then we must be efficient and the government must govern resolutely. If we first choose a government, then looking at both the ambitions and the fact that someone will win, someone will lose, all sorts of half-practical alliances will commence along with practical limitations: Don't give him television time; don't give him the Supreme Chamber of Control; don't give something else altogether, because well, this direction has been victorious, because he will approve his own. That is the first thing. That is why I would like to bring about a different situation. Let us justly clear the foreground for the government, let us give it opportunities for governance; then let us choose the government and let it govern. That is why I am carrying on such a conception, with the small constitution, so as to provide governance, so that governance can be effective. Only then can we propose a government of a prime minister of governance. There is only one opportunity, and it purportedly has twenty, that this Parliament will understand and will give the opportunity implementation, and only in such a case will it last and in such a case will it do the work. Others, it is only a matter of time until a (?rank and file) deputy or senator brings me a couple of buses and chases me—it has happened like this [word indistinct].

[Unidentified voice] If you could convince us about this provisional constitutional arrangement—would this have to last half a year, a year, the whole term of office?

[Walesa] We have Stalinist law, many times amended; we have loopholes—because this law was for a different economic philosophy—and the problem is how to quickly put these laws in order as a Parliament. And because I do not envisage that, that you could, I don't know, vote in stereo [as heard], and so there is a mine of work before you, and it is I who should give you the question: When will you do this?

And so long as you fail to do this, then I ask you to let someone else do it, so that we do not have economic anarchy, so that we do not sink in scandals, so that we can do something. If you manage to tidy things up within 24 hours, then glory to you. It's just a question of convincing the apparatus, gentlemen, that it must be quickly trained, and you must anticipate in a legislative way how we train voivodas and others and the new institutions. If you manage to do this within 24 hours, I am ready. Since I don't believe this, and what's more, I don't want to ridicule this first, free Parliament, I want to place the responsibility on someone else's shoulders, precisely onto the shoulders of the government that ... but to place the responsibility in such a way so that, if it proved unfavourable, for you, for the Parliament to have the means of saying: Stop, you are going too far, dear government or dear president, at any time of the day or night. There is no agreement to this. We are withdrawing this. A law for withdrawal does exist. However, if you fail to take into account that we do not have a law, or we have a communist one and you are democrats, then everyone will lose out on this bandwagon. But I am quick and land on my feet, and afterwards, well, I made proposals, I wanted it. Democracy outgrew. [as heard]

I am prepared as early as the first meeting to propose both a prime minister and, at least, a deputy prime minister, [words indistinct], a liaison, but here again, I would like you to clear up the foreground for him. Let him govern, because if we do not give this to him, that is when the tiffs will begin. I am a practitioner. That is when the (?tearing apart) will begin, because, after all, we know who wants to be defense minister. We know who wants to be the other minister, and we know who wants to be foreign minister. We also know other things, and we know that there are too many ministers and too many posts. We know what will immediately happen.

[Unidentified voice] I am sometimes surprised at the obstinacy with which you continue to force the candidacy of Mr. Bielecki.

[Walesa] Why do I respect Bielecki so much? Wherever he went, to whatever meeting or strike, he was never defeated. He was never thrown out. It was he who won everywhere. Yes, it's true, sir. And if I sent you to face four sitting women, you'd see how you'd run a mile. [as heard] Sir, I have travelled [word indistinct] and I also know about these things. He is so brave and such an expert that he is really needed by Poland—of course, in a different set up, having drawn conclusions. You, sir, are proposing to me today this beautiful slogan—we are changing everything, Bielecki, Balcerowicz—gone. In response, I am proposing this to you: Who will look after the economy—can you give me a candidate who will cope and will maintain some direction, will keep what is possible and good and repair what is bad. If you give me such a man then, sir, I shall kiss both your hands today. Let them laugh—I don't care—and I shall appoint him immediately. If you have got such a man—perhaps you can do it yourself—then I am a saint.

We must not destroy our two years. There are some achievements, but some things need to be corrected immediately—but how were we to know? How was the president to know when he sent Konopka, our press spokesman, to present the report on the situation, and an hour before the president was (?appointed), he failed to say goodbye, and just defected to another political camp, and so on. These are the people that we have, this is our world. I am not complaining about him, but I am saying we live in a real world. If someone puts forward decommunization as the main slogan, then I am very glad. But when this man had a chance to carry out a decommunization because he was chancellery head, which was the most communist of all the departments, then I am very sorry, but I believed in it, in decommunization slogans, and the president went in beautifully, the chancellery is clean. [as heard] Today I had to sack—how many did you sack?

[Unidentified voice] Ninety.

[Walesa] I had to sack 90 people at the first go, because I was really sitting on hot coals, and the main slogan of these forces is decommunization.

So, if they implement this decommunization as they implemented it at the president's, then thank you very much. I, in this corner, would like to create a strong government. So the topic of the scandal, unemployment, and let us return to my idea of privatization. Privatization is the only solution for Poland—it is wide for poor society.

[Unidentified voice] This law, speaking frankly, immobilizes the Sejm. It would be a good one, only a year ago, when there was a contractual Sejm. The prerogatives of this Sejm—and not the one from before 1989, but this one—are being limited in a very significant way.

[Walesa] That is why there is a weak government, because I do not have the right, an apolitical right! Anything that I want to do, I can't! This one will not look by this law! You explain to me that I want to be, that I want to have a dictatorship! I want to have an executive dictatorship, and if you do not have the right, then discuss it yourselves—for the whole, give me execution!

[Unidentified voice] What do you intend to do if the Sejm were, however, to be unfavorably disposed to your proposal?

[Walesa] I return this at the end, I return as a people's tribune, I return to society, and I wait for extra time. About which [words indistinct]. I cannot do otherwise, in the interests of Poland, in the interests of that which is taking place, in the interests of the dissatisfaction that exists. I cannot be the patron of that which I do not agree with, which has no chance. I end with this. I am sorry if I have offended anyone. There was not, I did not have such an intention. On the subject, I want us to understand that there is an historic responsibility for democracy, for the state, in a situation that is terribly difficult, in a situation of scandals and lack of law, and that we should calmly do this, reasonably well, and that we should hide our ambitions and the

presidential ambitions away, because the interest of the country is the greatest ambition and aim of our children—that they remain by the Vistula and be satisfied with their parents, that they have created good conditions for them. Thank you.

Text of 'Small Constitution'

AU0312095091 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA
in Polish 30 Nov-1 Dec 91 p 2

["Text" of "Small Constitution" proposed by the center-right parliamentary coalition in Warsaw on 27 November]

[Text] 1. The President of the Republic of Poland appoints the chairman of the Council of Ministers and, on the latter's recommendation, the remaining ministers.

2. The government presents its program to the Sejm and seeks its acceptance by means of a vote of confidence.

3. The Sejm holds a vote of confidence in the government by a simple majority of votes.

4. A failure to achieve a vote of confidence places the chairman of the Council of Ministers under an obligation to tender his government's resignation to the president, who is obliged to accept it.

5. The Sejm may hold a vote of confidence in the government on its own initiative. This requires an absolute majority of votes and a quorum of half the deputies.

6. A vote of no-confidence may not be held sooner than seven days from the day it was proposed. The proposal requires the support of at least 46 deputies.

7. Should the president reject the dismissal of the government toward which the Sejm has voted no-confidence, the Sejm may hold another vote within 30 days. Should the Sejm vote no-confidence by a majority of at least two-thirds, with a quorum of at least half the deputies, the president must accept the government's demise.

8. Should a motion to hold a vote of confidence be rejected, a second motion may not be made within six months of the first. This does not apply if the president rejects the vote of no-confidence, even if the vote was achieved by an absolute majority of votes.

9. The procedure described in Points 5 to 8 also apply to a vote of confidence toward a minister, whereby the six-month period mentioned in Point 8 is reduced to three months.

10. The president may dismiss the government on his own initiative.

11. The president may replace individual ministers on the recommendation of the chairman of the Council of Ministers.

12. The Sejm may, by means of a law, empower the Council of Ministers to issue decrees that possess the force of law at a time and to an extent specified in the constitution.

13. Repeals of or amendments to decrees are made by means of a law or by means of a decree that possesses the force of law.

14. The president of the Republic of Poland petitions the Sejm to appoint or dismiss the chairman of the Supreme Chamber of Control, civic ombudsman, and president of the Polish National Bank.

15. The president of the Republic of Poland appoints a National Security Council as the body responsible for state defense and security matters. The chairman of the National Security Council is the president of the Republic of Poland. The composition of the National Security Council and its scope and powers are defined by the constitution.

16. In matters of supreme importance for the state, the president of the Republic of Poland, and also the Sejm and Senate, may, by means of a joint resolution, call for a national referendum. The result of the referendum possesses the same legal force as the constitution, if the absolute majority of the electorate has spoken out on the issue at hand and at least half of eligible voters participated in the referendum.

17. Previous rules in conflict with this constitution are hereby made null and void.

Five-Party Coalition, Government Talks Continue

AU0212123491 Warsaw PAP in English 2200 GMT
27 Nov 91

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 27—President Lech Walesa received Wednesday morning Speaker of the Sejm (lower house of the Parliament) Wieslaw Chrzanoski and Prime Minister Jan Krzysztof Bielecki to discuss the question of the government's resignation.

According to Government Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski the sides "were fully concordant as to the conditions which can stabilize new cabinet solutions" and reached a consensus on the next year's economic programme, the issue of the so-called small constitution and special powers for the government, chiefly in the economy.

The leaders of the five-party centre right coalition who met Wednesday following the talks between the president, the Sejm speaker and the prime minister, expressed optimism as to the possibility of attaining their objectives.

Sejm Speaker Wieslaw Chrzanoski, who is the leader of the Christian Democratic Union (ZChN), which forms

the centre-right coalition together with the Liberal Democratic Congress (KLD), the Confederation for Independent Poland (KPN), the Peasant Agreement (PL), and the Centre Alliance (PC), told journalists that the president had not mentioned the name of his candidate for the future prime minister. "The president will announce his decision to the Sejm. He cannot be expected to use an intermediary," Chrzanoski stated.

Gabriel Janowski of the Peasant Agreement said the five wanted "harmonious cooperation with the president also in the area of his legislative initiative" and opined that the designation of the coalition's candidate for prime minister Jan Olszewski was "almost certain".

A similar opinion was voiced by KPN leader Leszek Moczulski. PC leader Jaroslaw Kaczynski declared that the Wednesday meeting proved that the president was beginning to acknowledge certain facts and marked a step forward towards the goal the five want to attain.

Asked to take a stand on the talks held between the Democratic Union and the Liberal Democratic Congress, Kaczynski stated that the congress had "certainly presented many of the coalition's concepts but it seems the talks failed to produce any significant results."

Council of Ministers Examines Financial Situation

AU0212124091 Warsaw PAP in English 2315 GMT
27 Nov

[Text] Warsaw, Nov. 27—The Council of Ministers examined Wednesday the draft report on the condition of the state which is expected to take the final shape by Thursday, Nov. 28. Members of the cabinet also discussed the assumptions of the 1992 social and economic policy and plan to return to the subject at their meeting next Tuesday.

The Council of Ministers is expected to continue to perform its duties until December 5, when the Sejm (lower house) is to examine the resignation of the Jan Krzysztof Bielecki cabinet submitted earlier this week.

By December 15, the cabinet also intends to present to the Parliament the provisional budget for the first quarter of 1992. Another meeting of the cabinet on the budget is planned for Friday.

The government got acquainted with the state of legislative work concerning the privatisation of flats. The programme proposed by the Minister of Housing Adam Glapinski is to cover some 2.8 million flats in housing cooperatives and some 1.4 million flats owned by enterprises.

The Council of Ministers earmarked from the state budget 9.4 billion zlotys (some 900 thousand dollars) missing to pay Poland's overdue membership fee to the International Labour Organization (ILO). All in all, overdue payments, also for the period when Poland

suspended its cooperation with ILO in the 1980s, amount to 18.5 billion zlotys (about 1.8 million dollars).

The Council of Ministers also resolved to earmark 33 billion zlotys (over 3 million dollars) from the budget reserves to partially cover the costs of the parliamentary

elections. Some 46 billion zlotys (over 4 million dollars) will remain to be paid after the state electoral commission presents all bills. The costs of elections were much higher than planned, and Government Spokesman Andrzej Zarebski puts the blame for this on the electoral law.

Chebelev Discusses Ukraine Independence Issues

*AU0212224691 Bucharest Radio Romania Network
in Romanian 2038 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Interview with Ambassador Traian Chebelev, Foreign Ministry spokesman, by Doina Pelciu on 2 December; place not given—recorded]

[Text] [Pelciu] Ambassador Traian Chebelev, please tell us what shape our relations with the Ukraine will take now, after the 1 December referendum, during which the overwhelming majority of the people voted for independence.

[Chebelev] At the moment, we are faced with two types of problems in our relations with the independent Ukraine. The first type of problem is connected with the past, and the second is connected with the future.

As far as the past is concerned, this is well known. It can no longer be dissolved. Our government stated its position as early as last summer, when, on 24 June, the Romanian foreign minister presented in the Parliament the position of the Romanian Government, which sees the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact as an illegal act that flagrantly ignored the principles of international law and was null and void from the moment it was signed. The minister stressed the illegal nature of all its consequences, including the forced annexation of Romanian territories to the USSR that were thus included in the territorial structure of the Ukraine.

As far as the future is concerned, we must think of building relations of cooperation with the Ukraine. Considering the fact that the Ukraine is one of our neighbors and that we are talking about two countries, Romania and the Ukraine, with a significant economic potential, it is in the mutual interest of the people of the two countries to benefit as much as possible from this fact and from this geographical proximity.

It is also in our joint interest to create an appropriate framework and ensure conditions to achieve cultural exchanges and human contacts that are as intensive as possible.

[Pelciu] What are the effects of the referendum on the sphere of relations between Romania and the Ukraine?

[Chebelev] The referendum in the Ukraine represents an important moment in asserting the right of the Ukrainian people to self-determination. Even before the referendum, in the declaration issued by Romania's Government, we expressed the fact that we looked favorably upon this act and, at the same time, we expressed our readiness to establish diplomatic relations between Romania and the Ukraine and, in general, to develop friendly relations of good neighborliness and cooperation based on the principles of international law.

As a matter of fact, here we are talking about the same position that our government also adopted in connection

with the other republics in the USSR that have proclaimed their independence. We hope that an understanding regarding the establishment of diplomatic relations will become possible as soon as possible.

Certainly, there is the issue connected with the Romanian territories incorporated on the basis of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact within the USSR and the Ukraine respectively. We are talking about the recognition of this problem in Romanian-Ukrainian relations, an issue that comes from the past and that will have to be solved in the spirit of and in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act and of the Paris Charter for a new Europe.

[Pelciu] The Ukrainian officials qualified the Romanian Parliament's declaration as interference in the domestic affairs of the Ukraine and, in general, they declared that the Ukraine does not have any territorial claims, but it does not admit to any territorial claims directed against the Ukraine, either.

[Chebelev] As far as we are concerned, we can talk neither about interference in the domestic affairs of the Ukraine nor territorial claims directed toward this country. The problem of the Romanian regions that were incorporated by force in USSR in 1940 is an extremely sensitive subject for the Romanian public, as you know very well. The public made both the Parliament and the government take a clear position, without equivocal meanings, at a moment when the evolutions in Europe and especially in the USSR open up the possibility to overcome the problems inherited from the totalitarian communist regimes.

Our government hailed the partial repair of the consequences of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, achieved through the proclamation of the independence of the Baltic republics and of the Republic of Moldova. To carry out to the very end this repair of the consequences of this Pact, including the issue of the Romanian territories that are part of the Ukraine, is in the interest of developing good Romanian-Ukrainian neighborly relations.

The fact that we are not talking here about a territorial claim can be proved also by our government's attitude toward the Republic of Moldova, whose territory—the greatest part of it—as a matter of fact, was annexed to the USSR on the basis of the same Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact. We did not ask for this territory to be returned to Romania. Both the Romanian Government and the Government of the Republic of Moldova agreed that the best way to safeguard the interests of the Romanian people is through the existence of two Romanian states and that the relations between them will develop in accordance with the European evolutions.

Likewise, our government's approach to the issue of the territories taken away from Romania and annexed to the Ukraine is pragmatic. The problem is to overcome this inheritance from the past, which we cannot pretend that

we do not see; it should be surmounted through negotiations, in the spirit and in accordance with the provisions of the Helsinki Final Act. No doubt these negotiations will have to be attended by the Republic of Moldova as well.

The recognition of the existence of this problem, whose solution should be in accordance with the principles of the CSCE, will no doubt take time, and this problem does not have to stop us from being concerned with the way in which Romanian-Ukrainian relations should develop. The two countries should have mutually advantageous cooperation, both in the political as well as the economic and cultural areas. We believe that this is the best way we can serve the interests of both states. The alternative would be to freeze relations, and I do not know who would benefit from this.

PNT-cd Lists Objections to New Constitution

AU2911195591 Bucharest DREPTATEA
in Romanian 26-27 Nov 91 p 1

["The Attitude of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party Toward the New Constitution"]

[Text] The Steering and Control Bureau of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNT-cd]—after examining the conditions in which the proceedings of the Constituent Assembly took place and the statements made there by PNT-cd parliamentarians—makes the following clarifications:

1. Convinced of the need for a democratic fundamental law, the PNT-cd made public its own draft constitution, which it published in the newspaper DREPTATEA and separately in some 100,000 copies. The majority grouping deliberately ignored this project. Likewise, the PNT-cd also distributed a sizable number of copies of the 1923 Constitution, for the guidance of both the public and the members of the Constituent Assembly.

2. The main PNT-cd objections to the Constitution voted by the FSN [National Salvation Front] majority are:

a) The new Constitution establishes the republic as the form of government in Romania without prior consultation of the people and stipulates in its final provisions that the republican form cannot be revised. Thus, the citizens are invited to pronounce themselves on the monarchy or republic, along with the other 152 articles, which is an undemocratic procedure.

b) The new Constitution does not clearly stipulate the separation of powers in the state and flagrantly prejudices the judicial power, whose role as referee is substantially diminished by subordinating it to the executive branch.

c) The powers granted to the president are much too large for a country trying to rid itself of the traps of totalitarianism. The presidential republic does not offer

enough guarantees that the head of state, whoever he may be, will not be tempted to assume even greater prerogatives, thus pushing the country once more toward dictatorship. The comparison with the United States and other countries with long-standing democratic traditions cannot comfort the citizens of a country that has experienced miners' incursions that were not alien to the presidency. According to the current draft of the Constitution, the president can send back for reexamination a law voted by Parliament, can appoint judges to the most important courts, and so forth. He can only be suspended through a very difficult procedure and cannot be automatically sued for violation of constitutional or moral norms.

d) The Constitutional Court, made up of nine people (three appointed by the president, three by the Deputies' Assembly, and three by the Senate), with such duties as ascertaining the "nonconstitutionality" of laws voted by Parliament and the "nonconstitutionality" of political parties is a superposition of the executive and legislative branches over the judicial power. This court will be a fourth power in the state and will jeopardize the balance of powers in a democratic state.

e) The revision of the Constitution is made conditional upon the signatures of 500,000 citizens, from at least half of the country's counties, with the obligation that at least 20,000 signatures should be registered from each of these counties. In these circumstances, the modification of certain hampering, inappropriate provisions will prove almost impossible. Any democratic constitution must also provide for flexible and adequate ways for its change, without political and social upheavals.

We are only doing our duty to draw the attention of citizens to the consequences of such provisions for the future of democracy, and we invite them to go through the Constitution's articles, where they will also find many other inappropriate formulations. This is an important moment in the life of the nation, and the 8 December vote will decisively affect not only this generation but also the life of future generations.

These are some of the reasons why our parliamentarians voted against the Constitution in its current form. Consequently, the PNT-cd leadership urges all citizens to reject the Constitution. The very haste with which the date of the referendum was fixed proves that the FSN authorities are afraid of an in-depth examination of the provisions of some of the basic articles.

The PNT-cd Steering and Control Bureau

PAC Urges Voters Not To Endorse Constitution

AU3011145791 Bucharest ROMPRES in English
0941 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES 30/11/1991—In a statement given for release to the ROMPRES, the Civic Alliance Party [PAC] considers Romania's new Constitution "only half a step ahead toward the state of law."

The other half of the step—the statement shows, cannot be achieved without introducing, among other things, in the country's fundamental law, the principle of power-sharing and the guaranteeing of property, and eliminating or rewording numerous equivocal articles. At the same time, the Civic Alliance Party considers that, for the stability of the new institutions, a constitution is absolutely necessary and it sets itself as major political target the revision of the undemocratic spirit of the current Constitution.

The Civic Alliance Party opines that a referendum would have been necessary before the endorsement of the Constitution and that it should have established the form of government. The referendum of December 8 is tardy and useless. The fundamental law, the first article of which consecrates the republican form of government has already been passed by a Constituent Assembly created precisely to this end and made up of the elected representatives of the nation.

At the close of the statement, the Civic Alliance Party recommends abstention from participation in the referendum.

UDMR's Szocs Criticizes New Constitution

*AU0312095791 Budapest BESZELO in Hungarian
30 Nov 91 p 26*

[Interview with Geza Szocs, deputy chairman of the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania, by Ilona Kiss over the telephone; place and date not given: "Romania for the Romanians?"]

[Excerpts] Romania is a united nation state! This is what the new Romanian Constitution proclaims once again (and this time irrevocably), a Constitution that was approved by the Romanian Parliament last week and that will be submitted to a referendum on 8 December. "The result of the referendum can hardly be doubtful,

though," Geza Szocs, senator for the Democratic Association of Hungarians in Romania [UDMR—in Hungarian, RMDSZ] told us when we asked him to comment quickly on the new Constitution. [passage omitted]

[Szocs] This Constitution is unacceptable for Hungarians in Transylvania from several points of view. It does not correspond to our expectations as far as national minority rights are concerned; nor does it satisfy general democratic principles. These two viewpoints are usually intertwined. The Constitution's major flaw is that it follows the example of an ethnocratic [etnokrata] presidential republic that presupposes a very centralized state organization as the framework for the future functioning of Romania's society. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the text of the Constitution does not make a reassuring distinction between the legislative, executive, and judicial spheres. The first article of the Constitution declares that the country is a united nation state, and it does not contain any substantial guarantees whatsoever for the implementation of national minority rights. [passage omitted]

[Kiss] Why did the Constitution have to be approved in such a rush?

[Szocs] This Parliament and the National Salvation Front—which plays a decisive role in the Parliament—want to legitimize their existence retroactively by demonstrating political achievement. At the same time, they want to create the appropriate political framework that will make it possible to occasionally pass some very restrictive human rights paragraphs to serve the authorities' interests. [passage omitted]

[Kiss] Did the UDMR represent united principles during the drafting of the Constitution?

[Szocs] The UDMR parliamentary group submitted approximately two dozen amendment proposals. There was a separate package that was signed by 26 of our 41 UDMR representatives. I drafted that package.

However, the proposals that could have truly changed the spirit of the Constitution were never even discussed. [passage omitted]

International

Milosevic, Vance Discuss UN Peacekeeping Force

LD0212192991 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—“Today I talked with General Kadijevic and President Milosevic about what can be done to implement the agreement we reached a week ago in Geneva. I am very dissatisfied with the fact that neither of the three principles under the Geneva agreement has been implemented in a satisfactory way until now.” The UN secretary general's special envoy, Cyrus Vance, said this following almost three-hour long talks with the Serbia President Slobodan Milosevic. Vance recalled that the Geneva agreement, signed 23 November, apart from him, by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Kadijevic. The agreement contains three basic principles—the deblocking of barracks in Croatia, the Army's withdrawal, and equipment from Croatia and Dalmatia. “I talked with both Kadijevic and Milosevic about what ought to be done to implement these three principles, how to do that, and how to remove obstacles on the way to this,” Vance said. He, however, failed to specify which obstacles are hampering the implementation of the Geneva agreement, and the arrival of the UN peacekeeping forces.

Journalists asked Vance to comment on a recent statement by Croatian President Tudjman that the main objective of the UN peacekeeping forces is to protect Croatia's constitutional order and its borders. Vance said that everyone knows the UN strategy. Its main task is to determine the crisis zones. Afterwards, these zones will be demilitarized and peacekeeping forces will be deployed there, he said. The UN Secretary General's personal envoy refused to be drawn on when peacekeeping forces will arrive in Yugoslavia. He said, above all, that obstacles which are hampering the realization of the idea on blue helmets, must be removed. Vance will talk about this also with Croatian President Tudjman.

Assessing today's talks with Vance, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic said he thought that a step forward had been made in clarifying the Yugoslav situation. “I share the view of Mr. Cyrus Vance regarding the fulfillment of the first condition for the coming of the peacekeeping forces to Yugoslavia.” That first condition, Milosevic said, is that cease-fire should be observed. “I hope that the entire Yugoslav public over the past few days became aware of the fact that the Croatian side did not want to observe the cease-fire. That is practically the continuation of the widely-known policy according to which recognition of the independent state of Croatia can be achieved with the help of foreign factors through violation of the cease-fire. I think that such a strategy and such behavior will certainly not survive the test of time, i.e. that they will fail the exam.”

Like Vance, Milosevic was also asked about a recent statement of Croatian President Tudjman, i.e. about the goals of the UN peacekeeping forces: “Everyone is trying to gain

some political points in this situation, but I presume that every Yugoslav citizen clearly understands that the peacekeeping forces are coming here with one single aim, that Mr. Vance is here with one aim in mind—to establish peace in the country. Peace can be established if warring sides are separated. As you know, there are no warring sides along administrative borders between Serbia and Croatia or between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, but the warring sides are situated on the edges of Serbian Krajinas and the Croatian territory, a territory from which the Croatian authorities, again committing genocide in this century, are trying to deny the inhabitants of those territories the right to self-determination, to threaten their freedom, peace, and safety,” President Milosevic said.

Replying to a question regarding the deployment of the peacekeeping forces in the Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina and whether the Krajina leadership is going to allow the deployment of blue berets, Milosevic said: “I think that this is a simplified explanation of the position of the Krajina Serbs. As I understood their explanations, they are not against the deployment of the peacekeeping forces. The only thing that they want is that their deployment and role be precisely defined and that Serbs are guaranteed freedom and safety, which is, it seems to me, a logical request.” Warning that a possibility exists that the cease-fire would not be completely observed, Milosevic said: “Judging by what has been happening over the past few days, and respecting efforts of UN representatives, we can state with a high degree of certainty that the deployment of peacekeeping forces in these areas soon is completely likely.”

Milosevic Satisfied With Talks

AU0212214891 Belgrade RTV Sat TV
in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Interview with Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic by correspondent Snezana Rodic on his talks with Cyrus Vance, UN secretary general envoy for Yugoslavia, in Belgrade on 2 December—recorded]

[Text] [Rodic] Mr. President how would you assess today's talks with Mr. Vance?

[Milosevic] I believe that today's talks represent a step forward in resolving the situation in Yugoslavia. I must say that I share Cyrus Vance's position regarding the fulfillment of the first condition for the arrival of UN peace troops in Yugoslavia.

The first condition is the observation of a cease-fire. I hope that during the last few days the entire Yugoslav public was able to see the fact that the Croatian side did not want to observe the cease-fire. This is actually the continuation of the well known politics of violating cease-fires with the help of the foreign factors—which you know very well and which the Yugoslav public also knows about—to achieve the recognition of the Independent State of Croatia [Nezavisna Drzava Hrvatska, reference to the World War II Croatian

state]. I think that such a strategy and such behavior most certainly will not stand the test of the times that are before us.

Markovic Addresses European Cities Conference

*LD0112005591 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2115 GMT 30 Nov 91*

[Text] Budapest, November 30 (TANJUG)—The Conference of European Cities, devoted to peace in Yugoslavia and their contribution to the settlement of its conflict, ended in Budapest tonight by adopting an appeal to all European cities to do everything to end the war and help the citizens of Yugoslavia.

The general-secretary of the permanent conference of Yugoslav cities, Bosko Markovic, delivered basic information on the position of Serbs which Croatia cannot drive away from Yugoslavia by force since they voted at plebiscites to remain within it.

Markovic said that the representatives of Croatia tried to use the gathering for propaganda purposes by handing out leaflets about alleged war crimes against Croatia.

He added that neither the Yugoslav People's Army nor Serbia wanted Croatian territories, but noted that they were trying to protect the Serbian people from genocide, which they had already experienced during World War II.

Markovic urged the adoption of an appeal in which no one would be the accuser or the accused, but which would emphasize the wish of all to help in finding peace in Croatia.

EC Lifts Sanctions on Four Republics, Not Serbia

*LD0212230891 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1936 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Brussels, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—The foreign ministers of the European Community member-states today decided to introduce preferential commercial regulations for the Yugoslav republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia and thus exempt them from the sanctions imposed on Yugoslavia at the EC summit in Rome on November 8.

What this practically means is that these Yugoslav republics are being given back the facilities they had under the old agreement on cooperation between the EC and Yugoslavia. This, among other things, means they can again get aid under the PHARE [Economic Reconstruction Aid for Poland and Hungary] programme.

The EC Ministerial Council today asked of the European Investment Bank to grant to these Yugoslav republics the one hundred million ECUs [European currency units] left over from the second EC-Yugoslavia financial protocol for financing capital projects.

Chairman of the EC Ministerial Council Hans van den Broek today said that these "positive compensatory measures" should cancel out the negative effects for the four

republics of the EC economic sanctions against Yugoslavia, says an official statement released after the session.

The final document from today's session makes no mention of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia. As for Montenegro, the twelve agreed to closely follow developments in order that the measures adopted today might possibly be expanded to include that Yugoslav republic as well.

TANJUG learns that today's conference in Brussels brought to light certain differences as regards Montenegro, as some delegations, specifically the Italian delegation, asked that it, too, be exempted from the sanctions.

TANJUG learns that France also had some reservations as regards the project of "positive compensatory measures" although it voted in favour, and that the Greek delegation abstained.

The document empowers the committee of permanent EC representatives in Brussels to continue to review other restrictive measures which might prove necessary, taking as their point of departure the proposals of the committee and some member-states.

The twelve underline that the adoption of the measures today "in no way prejudices the recognition of individual republics."

Ambassador in Brussels Deems EC Decision 'Hasty'

*AU0212165891 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Here is the first reaction to the EC decision that economic sanctions will only apply to Serbia and Montenegro. Dr. Mihajlo Crnobrnja, ambassador of the SFRY Mission in Brussels, gave a special statement for Belgrade Radio:

[Begin Crnobrnja recording] I think the decision of the Council of Ministers, adopted today, is hasty and not sufficiently balanced.

In connection with this I would like to inform the domestic public that prior to the meeting of the Council of Ministers I met with The Netherlands delegation, which is the chairman of the council. On this occasion I handed them a note from the SFRY Government regarding the sanctions that have applied so far and especially regarding the cancellation of the agreement [presumably the customs agreement between the EC and Yugoslavia that gave preferential treatment to Yugoslav goods] and to the so-called positive measures that the ministers adopted today.

It is obvious that the ministers adopted today's decision under great pressure from Germany. I think it is not very clear yet but it will eventually transpire that a decision to resolve the Yugoslav crisis by favoring one or the other side, was too hasty.

I think Europe must return to the principle of equality, that is to say, the principle of equal treatment for all sides in the Yugoslav crisis. It must strive so that a political solution is found within the Hague Conference that is acceptable for our territory and that the Europeans can then finally support.

By behaving as they did they rushed into a decision and it is now a great question how to proceed. That is to say, a danger exists that the situation will become even more complicated instead of being resolved and instead of securing peace, which everybody wants, for our territory.

The argumentation of the individual members of the conference, that is to say, of the Council of Ministers—who are perfectly aware of the fact that they are giving in to a certain amount of pressure and that they are perhaps agreeing to something that might not be the best solution—is based on the assumption that all this is not final, that these are still only political maneuvers, and that there are still chances that all the warring sides, including therefore, Serbia and Montenegro, which are suffering at the moment as well, will again find themselves at the negotiating table, that is to say, that they will take part in a constructive process of seeking a permanent and stable peace and a solution for the Yugoslav crisis. [end recording]

Paris Club Refuses To Negotiate Yugoslav Debt

*LD0212114691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1031 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Belgrade, December 2 (TANJUG)—Paris Club of creditors refused to negotiate Yugoslav debt deferment and demanded that these debts be repaid on a regular basis, if cooperation was to continue, Yugoslav Government information secretariat said.

The Yugoslav side, as set out by the Paris Club announcement, failed to return the 640 million dollar principle, which fell due between July 1989 and mid-1990, and that which was due over the past 15 months was not being paid back at all.

Another unpleasant factor was the spreading of war conflicts in Yugoslavia of late as well as the disturbances in the Yugoslav payment operations and monetary systems.

The agencies Hermes [words indistinct] have already begun approving short-term credits to banks in Slovenia and Croatia on selective basis, after these republics managed to meet their obligations, and expressed readiness to do business with the Yugoslav republics of Macedonia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The overall Yugoslav foreign debt was around 14.5 billion dollars, of which the National Bank of Yugoslavia guaranteed 11.7 billion.

The E.C. countries were owed 6.3 billion dollars, while international financial institutions 3.2 billion dollars, the industrial countries (OECD) 2.5 billion and the EFTA [European Free Trade Association] countries one billion dollars.

Federal

Kostic Urges EC To Understand Threat to Serbs

*LD0212232691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2255 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] Loznica, Yugoslavia, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—Vice-President of the Yugoslav State Presidency Branko Kostic tonight said he was not surprised by the European Community's decision to exempt all the Yugoslav republics except Serbia and Montenegro from sanctions, because the EC had been dealing with the Yugoslav crisis from the positions of power rather than those of justice and international law.

If the EC had acted from the positions of international law, it would not have tried to obliterate Yugoslavia with a sleight of pen as though it did not exist on the political map of the Balkans and of Europe, Kostic said, speaking at a gathering of the leadership of Serbia's ruling Socialist Party for Loznica.

Kostic, who is Montenegro's representative to the State Presidency, said that the EC must finally understand that the Serbian people in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia are threatened with physical elimination, with another genocide. The best example of this is the genocide at its most brutal to which the Serbian people have been subjected in the part of the western Slavonia region where the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) has not been there to protect them, he added.

Serb refugees testify that Croatian irregulars have burned down a score of Serbian villages in western Slavonia and massacred those of the people who failed to escape in time.

The international community must realize that there is no part of the Serbian nation in this Yugoslavia who would abandon the Serbs in Croatia to another physical liquidation and genocide, regardless of any economic sanctions or an oil embargo, Kostic stressed.

He accused Croatia's ruling Democratic Union (CDU) of being a party of Nazi-fascism and resurrected Ustashism. In his view, the party's orientation has contributed to the spreading of an awareness that its rule bears a strong resemblance to what Europe went through under Hitler.

The vice-president of the Presidency of Yugoslavia said that Yugoslavia is at present closer to peace than before, because the "Croatian leadership has realized that it cannot attain its objectives with arms and bloodshed, and the world is beginning to realize more and more the true cause of the deep state and political crisis in Yugoslavia."

Kostic Views Prospects for 14th Cease-Fire

LD2911224491 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1724 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Titograd, Nov 28 (TANJUG)—Vice-President of the Yugoslav Presidency Branko Kostic assessed today that the 14th cease-fire, signed in Geneva on Saturday [30 November] under the United Nations' auspices, "has more chance to succeed than the previous thirteen".

The first reason is that "it seems that the leadership of the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia has finally understood that it could not achieve what it expected by imposing the war option. It means that it cannot impose its vision of an 'independent state' on the Serbs in Croatia by employing armed forces", Kostic explained in an interview to the Titograd daily POBJEDA.

Vice-President Kostic said that extremist forces in Croatia were most probably the most responsible for the crimes committed so far. This does not mean that the Croatian Government and President Tudjman, who brought foreign mercenaries into his army, could be relieved of all responsibility.

Also, added Kostic, the Croatian leadership has seen for itself that "nothing can be achieved by military force". In such a situation, "the indication of the arrival of United Nations peacekeeping forces could for them... mean a honorable way out of this situation".

Third, the international community is increasingly aware that it is absurd to even think that the Serbian people could remain within the "independent state of Croatia". For, if we want a peaceful solution, then we must look for it in such a way so that peace really reigns in these regions.

The new Croatian Constitution, adopted a year ago, denies the Serbs in the Yugoslav Republic the status of a people, guaranteed to them by the Yugoslav Constitution.

Kostic noted that certain countries, above all, Germany, which avidly encouraged Croatia's and Slovenia's secession, found togetherness in Europe much more important than support to secessionists.

Also, the role of the United Nations as a new factor in the search for a peaceful solution, offers more grounds to expect the fourteenth cease-fire to yield better results than the previous one, Kostic concluded.

Government Seeks 'Urgent Deployment' of UN Forces

LD0212212991 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2033 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, Dec 2 (TANJUG)—The Yugoslav Government today issued a statement to the effect that it considers as the first priority at the moment the "creation of conditions necessary for an urgent deployment of blue helmets

[UN peacekeeping forces] in the country, even in a small number, in view of the fact that their deployment in full would require more time."

At its session chaired by Federal Prime Minister Ante Markovic, the government reviewed the activity of the federal bodies in connection with the peace initiatives for resolving the Yugoslav crisis, the statement says. The Federal Government described as highly important the current mission of the U.N. secretary-general's special envoy to Yugoslavia Cyrus Vance. The statement stresses that success of the mission depends primarily on the implementation in full of the 14th agreement for a cease-fire in Yugoslavia, signed in Geneva last Saturday [30 November].

If there is no ceasefire, there will certainly be no blue helmets in Yugoslavia, the government said. The government expressed indignation that the hexagonal group of countries should have held their ministerial conference in Venice in the absence of Yugoslavia, although Yugoslavia heads the association. It is a big question if the conference reflected the efforts for a peaceful settlement of the Yugoslav crisis, the statement adds.

The Yugoslav Government asked for agreement to be reached on the functioning of the country during the transitional period, which should remain in force until the final settlement of the Yugoslav crisis.

The statement goes on to say that the "government will give support only to those acts which should be conducive to cooling the passions, relaxing the tensions and putting an end to the fighting." The Yugoslav Government will be governed by this principle "regardless of how much longer it remains in office and regardless of the fact that its scope of activity is being narrowed more and more."

FEC Dismisses Radio-Communications Chief

LD0312014691 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1252 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—On the proposal of the Federal Secretariat for Transportation and Communications, the Federal Executive Council [FEC] has relieved Drasko Marin of the duty of the director of the Federal Administration for Radio-Communications.

The FEC's Information Secretariat said that Drasko Marin was relieved of the duty because his activities overstepped the power that he enjoyed as the director of the Federal Administration for Radio-Communications.

Slovenia

Bucar Rejects Request for Confidence Vote

AU0312093391 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 0600 GMT 3 Dec 91

[Text] Dr. France Bucar, president of the Slovene Assembly, has informed Lojze Peterle, president of the Slovene Government, in writing that Peterle's demand

for a vote of confidence in the government is impossible to meet. Dr. Bucar explained that the question of confidence should be connected to a specific issue and the corresponding articles of the Constitution and the rules of procedure of the Slovene parliament do not envisage vote of confidence about general issues.

Rupel: Vance Believes Croats 'Making Mistake'

LD3011143891 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2200 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] Ljubljana, November 29 (TANJUG)—The foreign minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Slovenia, Dimitrije Rupel, tonight said that the special envoy of the U.N. Secretary-General, Cyrus Vance, believes that "Croats are making a mistake in the war (in Croatia) by unnecessarily humiliating the Yugoslav People's Army." Rupel told a news conference after his return from a tour of France, the United States, Canada, Luxembourg and Belgium, that there were many negative qualifications about Croats in the world. Rupel said that Canadian political circles, as well as officials of the Luxembourg Foreign Ministry, were highly critical of Croatia's policy. Rupel said his hosts in the countries he visited were mainly favourable concerning the international recognition of Slovenia. The Yugoslav Republics of Slovenia and Croatia unilaterally declared secession from Yugoslavia last June.

Ministry Sends Letter to CSCE Official

AU2911175891 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network
in Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Text] We have here the letter that the Slovene Foreign Ministry sent yesterday to Mr. Nils Eliasson, director of the CSCE Secretariat. In the letter, the ministry presents Slovenia's stand that those Yugoslav republics that [words indistinct] successful solution to the Yugoslav crisis should also directly participate in the CSCE process. In Slovenia's opinion, apart from international conditions for (?becoming an international subject), one should also respect the principles of unalterability of external and internal borders by force, of respecting human rights and [word indistinct] freedoms, and of an international guarantee of protecting members of national minorities.

In its letter, the Slovene Foreign Ministry also expresses the opinion that republics are now subjects of international [word indistinct], because, after the quiet coup d'etat and military aggression against Croatia, Yugoslavia in fact no longer exists, and all the internal and foreign activity of the federal institutions is unconstitutional and illegitimate.

Croatia

President Tudjman Holds News Conference 2 Dec

LD0212153791 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1110 GMT 2 Dec 91

[News conference by Croatian President Franjo Tudjman with unidentified foreign and domestic correspondents in Zagreb—live]

[Text] [Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, what is Croatia gaining by international recognition, something that will probably take place, in concrete terms? What is your comment on Mr. Genscher's statement that Croatia should become an associate member of the EC? Do you believe that this will take place very soon or will we have to wait a while? Since I have taken the floor I will ask another question; it is about the political implications of the Dedakovic case. Would you comment on the claims that Dedakovic is being ill-treated in prison?

[Tudjman] What is Croatia gaining by international recognition? Well, it gets all those things that all peoples of this world aspire to—to become international entities on equal terms in the international community of nations.

Mr. Genscher's statement, his proposal that Croatia should become an associate member of the EC, also means recognition, recognition in real terms, the recognition that Croatia has already won. It means an open path for Croatia to the EC. You know how arduously the EC was created and what kind of conditions had to be met by a country that wanted to become an EC member. Understandably, this alone will not render Croatia a full-fledged member yet. But, this is why he proposes that it should become an associate member even prior to its recognition, this also testifies to the reputation Croatia commands.

As for the Dedakovic case, I personally, and the entire Croatian Government, I believe, oppose any torture of anyone in prison. The same applies to Dedakovic, regardless of what he is charged with. It seems to me that this whole case, regardless of whether that was done in the course of his arrest and his resistance to it, or I do not know what, to Paraga, anyway, any form of torture is intolerable in a law-governed state and I condemn it. But, by the same token [passage indistinct] by signing a report that is at odds with the true state of affairs, this also suggests a conspiracy assisted by Dedakovic himself [words indistinct]. This will have to be investigated and explained since in this area, too, there have been violations, that is, by-passing regular procedures.

[Freilich] Maja Freilich of SLOBODNA HRVATSKA. Mr. President, what is your response to Branko Kostic's statement yesterday that the Yugoslav Presidency maintains that the blue helmets should be sent only to the interposition line between the warring sides in Croatia. Since the Serbian conquerors and their assisting units are now evicting Croats from Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and Dubrovnik, how is Croatia to regain control of these areas and restore the previous demographic make-up?

[Tudjman] First of all, there is no such thing as the Yugoslav Presidency. There is, however, the putchist part of [words indistinct] and obviously, [words indistinct] so it will not be empowered to decide where the peace forces are to be stationed.

[Passage indistinct] under the agreement since the beginning of The Hague talks and the talks on sending in a peace force the Yugoslav Army must leave the entire

territory of Croatia. At the same time the peace forces are arriving in the crisis areas.

[Unidentified correspondent] [passage indistinct]

[Tudjman] I believe that it is precisely the recognition of Croatia that will prevent further aggression by the Yugoslav Army and all those Serbian paramilitary forces. In that case the Yugoslav Army and Serbia and Montenegro, being aggressors against Croatia, would be at war not only with Croatia but with the entire world, with Europe, the entire world. It seems to me that that is something they cannot afford. In that case [words indistinct] would also take some other measures. That would spell a total defeat and collapse of the aggressor.

[Unidentified correspondent] Could you please comment on what French Minister Kouchner said yesterday that Dubrovnik must become a demilitarized zone, which means, that the Croatian armed forces cannot be stationed there?

[Tudjman] I do not know anything about what Minister Kouchner said. I respect his humanitarian efforts, but I reject that he or anyone else can say what will happen to Dubrovnik. Dubrovnik is a part of Croatia, and no one can decide in advance what would happen to Dubrovnik. The Yugoslav Army must withdraw from Dubrovnik, as from other parts of Croatia.

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, can you tell us when and where are you going to meet Mr. Vance, and what will be the main topic of your talks and what you expect?

[Tudjman] I still do not know where we will meet. [sentence indistinct] Clearly, the talks will focus on the deployment of UN peacekeeping forces in crisis areas.

[Unidentified correspondent] A bill on minority rights is (?currently being passed) in Croatia. Do you, Mr. President, have assurances from other republics, from other areas of the former Yugoslavia, that they will adopt similar laws to protect Croatian and other minorities in those republics?

[Tudjman] We are passing that bill because it is in line with our constitutional orientation. We are passing it also in order to meet EC demands. I hold that the EC and the United Nations will find ways of ensuring that similar laws—this means human, civil and national rights of minorities and members of other nationalities in all other republics—will be passed. We do not have formal guarantees that this will be done, but with this act we are proving our orientation. I hold that the international community [passage indistinct]

[Unidentified correspondent] Mr. President, you recently announced in a speech to a police academy that new elections will be held soon. Could you please elaborate on this?

[Tudjman] As soon as we ensure peace, and in line with our new constitution, we will hold elections to prove that we are adhering to our constitutional regulations, to prove our consistency in implementing principles we have chosen.

Besides, it should be noted that today's Assembly was elected on the basis of old laws, so it has three chambers and that number is inappropriate for the normal work of the Assembly, for the Assembly to carry out its tasks as the supreme legislative body. So, both in order to adhere to constitutional regulations and to respect our orientation for a complete democratic system, we will hold new elections as soon as peace is established.

[Unidentified correspondent] [passage indistinct]

[Tudjman] Yes, I do think that was the only way. Unfortunately those opposing Croatia's sovereignty and independence used the worst means: They caused a war. We did not want it. We wanted to avoid it. For that reason we proposed that the Yugoslav federation—eroded by Serbian policy and Serbian imperialism—is transformed into an alliance of sovereign states in a peaceful and democratic manner. Serbia and the leadership of the Yugoslav communist army rejected that and they started a war. In such a situation, what could the Croatian leadership do? Either to go by the dictate of Belgrade's imperial policy, which wanted a centralized federation even without Slovenia—they not only (?allowed) Slovenia out but forced Slovenia out of Yugoslavia, but they wanted to keep Croatia and even to restore communism—so Croatia had no other option after Belgrade rejected the alliance of sovereign states, but to put up resistance to the Serbian aggression and the Yugoslav communist army. [sentence as heard]

The Croatian example also confirmed that no nation can gain its liberty, its independence, its autonomy without sacrifices. The Croatian nation, one of the oldest nations in Europe, nevertheless is establishing its independence after eight long centuries. In all this time, Croatia has never lost attributes of a state and national identity, but it was never fully independent and autonomous as it is now.

It is precisely this war waged against Croatia that shows what opponents we have against Croatian independence. We could not have avoided, but... [changes thought] These victims, which we had to make for freedom, for democracy, but not just for them, but for the survival of the Croatian nation and for the independence of Croatia, so that Croatia can enter—as I said in my answer to the first question—can enter the European and world community of nations as a full member; we had to make those sacrifices, which will be sacred for the Croatian state and Croatian freedom, and I, hence, think that the Croatian leadership, which won this democracy and established, adopted a Croatian constitution and which brought [Croatia] to the threshold of international recognition, (?bears) full responsibility (?for this). I personally and the Croatian Government and the Croatian Assembly did everything to gain that independence in a peaceful and democratic manner.

In our demand to gain full independence and full sovereignty for Croatia we did not proceed from selfish and narrow national goals. We know that the modern world is undergoing a process of integration civilization in all

respects: technological, cultural, and so on. Likewise, we are participants in a world process in the course of which a trend toward integration is running parallel with an increasing acknowledgment of national individuality of small nations. Croatia is a part of that trend in Europe and the world. We could not and we shall not renounce our demand for realizing freedom and sovereignty for Croatia, because we are realizing it, and, as I said, [passage indistinct].

[Unidentified correspondent] [passage indistinct]

[Tudjman] We accepted that the Yugoslav Army leave barracks in Croatia because the European and international community requested this from us, and because this was a reason cited by the Yugoslav Army and the Belgrade policy with its putschist Presidency that we blockaded barracks, that this put into jeopardy not just the Yugoslav Army staff but their families, and so on. But we accepted this the moment the EC took upon itself responsibility that Yugoslav Army units will leave Croatia and that they will not be redeployed against Croatia. At the same time, the Yugoslav Army pledged to hand over all territorial defense weapons to Croatia, weapons that were taken from Croatia before the establishment of the democratic government, and which were mainly left to Slovenes. So, Croatia accepted this also to gain peace more quickly in this way. The Yugoslav Army is leaving the territories of Croatia today, this day. Tomorrow it must leave the rest of Croatia, the crisis areas.

And if the war continues in spite of this, and if the Serbian-Montenegrin policy and the Yugoslav communist leadership would continue war in spite of everything, then we will be able to organize a defensive war from [words indistinct] two-thirds of completely free Croatian territory, we will be able to organize a defensive war for the liberation of the entire Croatian territory, more than we are able to do today, because we will have international recognition, and, as I said, because in that case Serbia, Montenegro, and the remnants of the Yugoslav, Serbian... [changes thought] Yugoslav Army would be at war not just with Croatia but with Europe and the entire world, which means, under much more favorable conditions for us than the current ones.

I think, in the view of negotiations we are conducting and in the view of the UN Security Council decision to send peacekeeping forces, that we are not on the threshold of a new war, but on the threshold of peace.

Separovic Appeals to Spain for Support

*LD2911235991 Madrid RNE-1 Radio Network
in Spanish 1900 GMT 28 Nov 91*

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] Zagreb accepts the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in war zones and not just between the Croatian forces and the Yugoslav Army. The Croatian foreign minister said this in statements to RNE-1. And he said more: he asked the Madrid government for direct help. RNE special correspondent Miguel Molleda reports from Zagreb. Good evening.

[Molleda] Good evening from Zagreb. Croatian Foreign Minister Zvonimir Separovic said this afternoon that he wishes to visit Spain as soon as possible, next week if possible, to talk with representatives of the Spanish Government and explain to them the dramatic situation that Croatia is suffering because of the aggression of the Yugoslav Army. In addition, the Croatian government has made an important concession in face of the crushing superiority of the Army and it now admits the possibility of UN peacekeeping forces establishing themselves in the war zone. Until now, Zagreb only accepted the deployment of the blue helmets on the historical border with Serbia, coinciding with the withdrawal of the Army from conquered territory. This change in Croatian policy was confirmed by the Croatian foreign minister himself in reply to a question on this point from RNE-1.

[Begin Separovic recording in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed translation into Spanish] The peacekeeping forces will have to enter the so-called crisis regions, but we believe and trust Europe when it says that those who are conquering cannot build up hopes of keeping what has been conquered. [end recording]

[Molleda] Spain, Separovic added, is an important country in the EEC that we envy for the peace that it enjoys for having succeeded in coming out of dictatorship and consolidating itself as a democratic nation. On this point, he added, the Spanish Government can help us at the EC summit next month in Maastricht. But it is not just a question of political understanding, the Croatian foreign minister said. We need the help of the Spanish people—spiritual and humanitarian help because 10,000 people have already died and there are over 60,000 wounded and 500,000 refugees who have been left without homes, destroyed by the Army.

Government Proclaims 'Compulsory Work Order'

*LD0212230191 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network
in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 2 Dec 91*

[Text] On the basis of a decree issued by the president of the Republic of Croatia on 23 November 1991, the government of the Republic of Croatia has issued the following declaration which we have just received from HINA [Croatian news agency]:

1. The president of the Republic of Croatia is introducing a compulsory work order [radna obaveza] on the entire territory of the Republic of Croatia.
2. All citizens who are registered for mobilization on the basis of the compulsory work order must respond to the summons and report to their place of work or other legal entities to which they are subordinate.
3. All men aged 18 to 60, to whom the compulsory work order applies, and displaced persons and refugees who, because of the war situation, are unable to report to their places of work to carry out their duty or to other legal entities, must report to the nearest municipal secretariat for national defense or to the Zagreb secretariat for

national defense in order to be registered for mobilization or else to be sent to reception centers under a registration plan to be drawn up and publicly announced by the municipal secretariats for national defense or the Zagreb secretariat for national defense.

All men aged 18 to 60, to whom the compulsory work order applies, who are not registered for mobilization must contact their municipal defense secretariat or the Zagreb defense secretariat with which they are registered or should be registered according to the call-up plan established and publicly announced by these defense secretariats.

Men to whom the compulsory work order applies and who, because of war circumstances—for instance, displaced persons and refugees—cannot contact the competent municipal defense secretariat with which they are registered or should be registered must contact the nearest municipal defense secretariat on whose territory they are at the moment, in order to register for mobilization purposes or for organized dispatch to reception centers according to a call-up plan established and publicly announced by these municipal defense secretariats.

Army conscripts who are abroad at the moment without permission from the competent municipal defense secretariat must immediately contact the nearest foreign representative office of the Republic of Croatia.

In accordance with the law on defense and the penal code, measures will be taken against those citizens who do not heed these orders, concludes the declaration of the Croatian Government, which was adopted at a government session today.

Status of Paraga's Citizenship Remains Open

LD291111391 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1803 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Ljubljana, 27 Nov (TANJUG)—Dobroslav Paraga, chairman of the Croatian Party of Rights, has been a citizen of the Republic of Slovenia since 16 October 1987. One month before that, as the Slovene STA news agency reported quoting sources at the Slovene Internal Affairs Ministry, Paraga's permanent residence was registered as being in Ljubljana, and he did not lose his citizenship by returning to Croatia.

According to Croatian laws at that time, Paraga must lose his Croatian citizenship, the STA says, and because there has not been any feedback from Zagreb, the Slovene Ministry of Internal Affairs is not sure whether Dobroslav Paraga is simultaneously a citizen of Croatia.

Serbia

Jovanovic Assails EC Sanctions Decision

LD0212213791 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service
in Serbo-Croatian 1808 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Text] Belgrade, 2 Dec (TANJUG)—In connection with the latest decision of the Twelve on economic sanctions, Serbian Foreign Affairs Minister Vladislav Jovanovic said in a

special statement for Radio Belgrade that the European Community has made yet another wrong move and in doing so, it has failed to make a real contribution to overcoming the Yugoslav crisis and to its peaceful resolution.

The EC is consistent in its support for the policy of unilateral secession, punishing republics and nations wanting to continue to live in a common state, Jovanovic said. The decision is incongruous with Cyrus Vance's mission; it is unjustified and unfounded, because only fabricated arguments could prove that Serbia is bad in any way as far as the Hague conference and the crisis in Yugoslavia are concerned.

From the beginning, Serbia has been cooperating and has been ready to approach or sign all previous cease-fire agreements. Although it is not a party in the war, it exerted its influence to goad the Serbs in Croatia to consistently observe cease-fire agreements, which the Serbs have done.

Stressing that Serbia supported the request for UN peace-keeping troops to come to Yugoslavia, Vladislav Jovanovic added that from the beginning, Serbia showed sincere interest in a cease-fire and a speedy overcoming of the Yugoslav crisis in the course of talks with Lord Carrington and Vance.

The new EC declaration is irreconcilable with The Hague conference, does not represent support for its work, and directly contravenes its rules, principles and goals, Jovanovic said. It violates the principle of equality of all participants of The Hague conference and the equal treatment of all options. The declaration is ushering through a big door the principle of discrimination which compromises the Hague convention and makes difficult the continuation of its work.

We regret that the Community is so persistent in its negative stance and that conditions for a speedy and comprehensive resolution of the Yugoslav crisis will be exacerbated, Vladislav Jovanovic told Belgrade Radio, stressing his belief that the EC will eventually understand that the policy of pressures, threats, and sanctions is not a policy of modern times nor that of the new European order, but that it is rather an echo of a period which we thought we had left behind and which certainly cannot fit the CSCE principles of equality and the equality of all participants of The Hague conference.

Commentary Criticizes Sanctions

AU0212154391 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 2 Dec 91

[Commentary by Dragan Colovic]

[Text] The European twelve have once again given in to the pressure of the most radical, the most intransigent, and the most partial member of the community, Germany, which is obviously not being particular about using any means to put Serbia and Montenegro in the

docks as the culprits for the current situation in Yugoslavia. Led exclusively by the wish to impose their own will—which probably proceeds from some old, unsettled, and essentially revanchist accounts—the Germans have again demonstrated that they do not care about a just solution to the current clash in Yugoslavia.

Dividing the members of the Yugoslav federation into those who are allegedly good and those who are allegedly bad, the European ministers succumbed to this un concealed desire and will, and in this way added fuel to the fire, which, if the aforementioned decision on restrictive measures is indeed only applied to Serbia and Montenegro, could flare up even more instead of gradually extinguishing itself peacefully, without passions and emotions, through equitable talks and agreements.

The German imposition of this discriminatory and tyrannical concept of resolving the Yugoslav crisis upon the European twelve, which at this stage has only economic and political, but does not exclude military characteristics, also proves that the EC is not as strong a structure as it appears to be prior to 9 and 10 December, when the twelve are supposed to adopt far-reaching decisions on an economic and political union in Maastricht.

One should no longer doubt that the current line that is being imposed on the EC by Germany with its brutal and discriminatory policy, if it is not opposed in time, could demolish the European fortress of 1992 and transform it into a house of cards.

The attempts to somewhat relativize and justify such unparalleled acts in international relations—to single out and punish parts of the same country—do not lessen the responsibility of all those within the European twelve, as well as those outside it, who assisted in doing this and who accepted it. We are talking about dangerously playing the card of creating further divisions, not only in Yugoslavia but also around it, which, and history should remind us of this, has never brought anything good to the European countries and the world, especially because it is false and senseless to accuse Serbia and Montenegro of not wanting to cooperate. This again proves that we are talking about political concepts among the EC twelve, who do not want to understand and accept the real causes of the Yugoslav crisis, which was started by the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia.

Jovanovic Accuses Budapest of Interference

LD0112171691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network in Hungarian 1600 GMT 1 Dec 91

[Text] The Serbian foreign minister has again accused Budapest of interfering in the internal affairs of Yugoslavia and claims that training camps for mercenaries have been established in Hungary.

At a debating forum in Subotica, Vladislav Jovanovic also criticized Hungary because, in his view, Hungary openly supports the breakaway republics.

But he also said that after ending the war in Croatia it can be expected that relations between the two countries will improve, in particular relations between the Serbian Republic and Hungary.

Jovanovic describes Hungary, Austria, Italy, and Bulgaria as the satellites of Germany, and accuses the Germans, that, as the leading power within the EC, they do everything possible to assist the disintegration of Yugoslavia.

Jovanovic Protests to Arbitration Committee

LD3011143191 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2043 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, November 28 (TANJUG)—Foreign minister of the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia Vladislav Jovanovic protested on Thursday [28 November] over the manner of work of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia and statements of conference chairman.

A letter to president of the Arbitration Committee Robert Badinter and chairman of the Conference on Yugoslavia Peter Carrington, Jovanovic stated dissatisfaction because the commission was ranking the issues sent to it for examination.

Jovanovic set out that there was not reason for the question of succession of Yugoslavia to enjoy priority over the three questions put forth by Serbia, since the question of succession emerged at the closing question of the work of The Hague conference.

Jovanovic points up also the necessity to consult the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and legal representatives of other Yugoslav organs.

In this context, Jovanovic cited that the questions and documentation were provided by the Republic of Serbia and given in advance to the other Yugoslav republics to adopt a stand, but the stands of these republics were not given to the Republic of Serbia, the Constitutional Court of Yugoslavia and other Federal organs.

In conclusion, Jovanovic criticizes Arbitration Commission President Robert Badinter for setting out his views to the media which pertained to the questions issues consideration by the commission.

Jovanovic reminded him that commenting these questions in public in a way that could point to possible consequences was not customary in the work of bodies such as the Arbitration Commission.

Kosutic Says Serbian-Croatian Coexistence Possible

LD2811234391 Belgrade TANJUG in English 2022 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, November 28 (TANJUG)—Serbian Vice-President Budimir Kosutic said today that Serbs and Croats could live again in a common state with the

other Yugoslav nations on condition that it was a "federal, multi-party and democratic state."

Kosutic told the Serbian parliament that human rights would have to be respected and that all nations would have to be equal in the future common state.

Kosutic recalled that the Belgrade proposal, put forward by the organs of the republics of Serbia and Montenegro, and the Serbian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, urged the creation of such a common state.

Kosutic said that he upheld the wish of the Croatian people for a national state "which it does not have and wants so badly," on condition that Croats allow the Serbian people to decide where and with whom they wish to live.

Asked if it was possible to stop the Serbian paramilitary formations which have announced an attack on Osijek, the largest administrative centre of the eastern Croatian region of Slavonia, Kosutic said that he did not believe that "larger settlements would be attacked."

The government of the Serbian autonomous region of Slavonia, Baranja and western Srem did not decide to attack Osijek, said Kosutic and warned that the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) and the Serbian territorial defence must protect the Serbian people from attacks by Croatian paramilitary formations.

Asked by a reporter on the Serbian government's stand on the replacement of Yugoslav Prime Minister Ante Markovic, Kosutic said that the federal government had lost the parliament's confidence and that its mandate had not been not extended, so that for some time now it had practically been an outgoing government. Kosutic added that the Serbian government would continue to respect all federal organs.

The Chamber of Republics and Provinces of the Yugoslav bicameral parliament passed a vote of no confidence to Ante Markovic, while the Federal Chamber is to vote on the matter in early December.

Belgrade Papers Discuss Moves for Autonomy

LD2711172491 *Belgrade TANJUG in English*
1139 GMT 27 Nov 91

[Text] Belgrade, Nov 27 (TANJUG)—The Belgrade daily POLITIKA writes today that aspirations for the creation of autonomous regions in the Yugoslav Republic of Croatia "have been provoked by a dissatisfaction with the current political apparatus" there.

The aspirations are voiced not only by Serbs, but also by other ethnic communities in Croatia, and this is evident even in parts where the supporters were numerous enough to bring election victory to the current leadership, says POLITIKA.

The Serbs in Croatia have unilaterally proclaimed autonomy for two regions—the Serb Autonomous

Region of Krajina and the Serb Autonomous Region of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.

POLITIKA goes on to list the examples of "a revival of the idea of Dubrovnik as a republic" and of Istria "which is trying to keep its balance between demands for autonomy and irredentists who have an eye on Italy's chance to snatch the territories of Istria, Rijeka and Dalmatia".

The paper quotes Italian minority leader from Koper Maurizio Tramallo as stating in Croatian papers that "the position of the Italians in Istria must be settled in trilateral talks of Italy, Slovenia and Croatia" and that "the Italians demand that the question of protecting minority rights in Istria be resolved on the basis of international principles".

The northern Adriatic peninsula of Istria is divided between two Yugoslav republics, Croatia and Slovenia.

It is to be expected that "the old idea of autonomy for Dalmatia" will also be raised with the Croatian leadership, says POLITIKA.

The Belgrade daily POLITIKA EKSPRES today also covers demands by Istrian Italians from Croatian and Slovenian authorities "for full territorial, political and cultural autonomy", noting that a petition for "Istria without borders" has been signed by almost 20,000 residents of Koper, Pula, Buzet and other Istrian towns.

"In addition to ethnic Italians, the petition was also signed by several thousand Slovenes and Croats", the paper adds.

Lordeana Debeljak from the Executive Committee of the Istrian Democratic Assembly told POLITIKA EKSPRES that a draft statute for Istria "insists on a high level of autonomy for this area and on the protection of the rights of the Italian minority".

"Leaders of ethnic Italians in Istria say that, if necessary, autonomy for Istria will be put to a referendum, regardless of what the Slovenian or Croatian authorities may think about it", the paper says.

Vojvodina

Hungarians Criticized for Joining Anti-Serb Group

AU0212180691 *Budapest MAGYAR HIRLAP*
in Hungarian 30 Nov 91 p 2

[Report by Vojvodina correspondent Istvan Kovacs: "Warning to Leaders of Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians—Milosevic: No Conflict on Serbian-Hungarian Border"]

[Excerpt] The Democratic Union of Hungarians in Vojvodina has sinned by joining the anti-Serbian coalition, supporting Croatian fascism, calling upon Hungarians in Vojvodina to desert, and trying to make them enemies with the members of other nationalities. These

serious but unsupported accusations were leveled by Sipovac, chairman of the [Vojvodina] provincial leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia, against the organization of Hungarians living in Vojvodina. Sipovac promised, once and for all, that official proceedings would be initiated against the leaders of the Democratic Union of Vojvodina Hungarians. [passage omitted]

Hungarian Representative on Community's Status

*LD2911205691 Budapest Kossuth Radio Network
in Hungarian 0750 GMT 29 Nov 91*

[Interview with Janos Vekas, vice president of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina, by correspondent Istvan Boercsoek; place and date not given—recorded]

[Text] [Boercsoek] You said the other day that there was open psychological war against the Hungarians of Vojvodina. Would you expound on this?

[Vekas] In essence, we find ourselves facing newer and increasingly grave forms of this war. I have to note that last Tuesday, Serbian People's Deputy Milan Paroski, who is probably also familiar in Hungary, and the military leader who is known as Captain Dragan were in Senta. They announced that they were organizing Serbian volunteer squads in Senta. They would not be taken to Croatian territory since units are needed here, in the northern Backa region, in Senta and Subotica, to defend Serbia.

We regard this to be further pressure on the Hungarian community, and the leadership of the Democratic Community of Hungarians in Vojvodina [VMDK] faces a decision on which course of action is best. Without a doubt there are certain forces that want to provoke the Hungarian community. We are of the view that it can naturally be only to the detriment of the Hungarian community of Vojvodina if it loses its level-headedness and its ability for sober deliberation.

Unfortunately, as far as the future is concerned, it must be presumed that the external pressure on Serbia will, as a matter of course, prompt homogeneity, thus taking society in a totalitarian direction.

A big question is at what point the Serbian democratic forces will rebel against this tendency. Regarding this, we must act cleverly, so that we separate two things: on the one hand the collective interests of the Vojvodina Hungarian ethnic group, and having clearly formulated these to take them to the international political arena; and on the other hand, to react constructively to every process within Serbia that promotes democratization, and to relate as a partner to every political force that also accepts us as a partner in the course of such a democratization process.

[Boercsoek] Have you been able to establish relations with the Belgrade peace movement?

[Vekas] That is under way. There have been new attempts. Most recently, the Democratic Party initiated

a sort of shadow parliament in Vojvodina. I must say that our opinion remains, unfortunately, that the Serbian social structure has not really become pluralistic. Right now there is a quasipluralist situation, and to be sincere, I am of the view that, unfortunately, there still is no significant democratic opposition.

[Boercsoek] The VMDK objected to Lord Carrington's most recent peace plan because it did not include a clause that Vojvodina is a historical component, and the section pertaining to personal autonomy was not included. Has there been any new development on this issue?

[Vekas] The news media have highlighted these two episodes. It is, indeed, true, that we, on the one hand, said in this letter that the initiative did not make explicit mention of personal autonomy or another form of cultural autonomy. However, it must be said that the plan itself provides the possibility for a solution, only it must be specified.

On the other hand, with regard to the status of the province, we, in the letter, said that we would indeed consider it justified to mention the province as a cultural and economic unit that evolved in the course of history. However, we also added that we do not regard this to be an alternative to minority self-government.

Thus, in essence we wrote to Lord Carrington that we do not regard the issue of the Vojvodina Hungarian community to be resolved by the province being given autonomy, since we know that at the moment the Serbs are in a majority in the province. Thus, Vojvodina as a region is one thing, and the safe-guarding of the minorities' self-determination is another thing. The two must be viewed in a manner whereby Vojvodina's autonomy would only create favorable conditions for the realization of the principle of minority self-government, or of self-determination of the Vojvodina Hungarian ethnic group, but in itself it does not guarantee this.

The third thing is that in this letter we stated that we would consider it unjustified if certain ethnic groups were to receive special status and if this option was withdrawn from others. We wrote that a significant number of Hungarians live in the northern part of Backa, and that our idea of personal autonomy naturally does not mean we would not consider it advantageous if this compact Hungarian region was not to have a certain, special status. We are of the view that the two would be mutually compatible.

Therefore, this is what is new. And we also stated, quite clearly, that we would consider it strange if Europe were again to take steps in an expressly pragmatic manner, whereby the Vojvodina Hungarian community, which essentially has an inclination for tolerance and coexistence, was to be punished by not being given the same rights as, for example, those given to the Serbs in Croatia.

Kosovo

LDK Chairman Requests Help From UN Forces

AU0212191991 Pristina BUJKA in Albanian
23 Nov 91 p 1

[Report by Behxhet Haliti: "Blue Helmets Would Prevent Possible Conflict in Kosovo"]

[Text] At this time of occupation and state repression exerted by Serbia against the Albanians and Kosovo, it has become normal for the Kosovo Democratic Alliance's [LDK] news conferences to list and condemn everything that has happened in Kosovo during the week, things that have taken place for no fault of the Albanians but because of Serbia's continuing efforts to incite a larger-scale conflict.

The police repression in Kosovo was an inevitable topic at yesterday's LDK news conference too, led by LDK Chairman Dr. Ibrahim Rugova.

The Albanians Will Not Leave Kosovo

Last week too was full of terror and repression for the Albanians in all areas of life. Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said at the start of the news conference. Albanians are still being dismissed from their jobs; dozens and hundreds are being dismissed from collectives and institutions every day. The number of Albanians dismissed from their jobs now exceeds 100,000, out of a total of 240,000 persons employed in Kosovo. Most of those remaining in work are Serbs and Montenegrins. Moreover, the maltreatment of the Albanians is continuing, and we even have cases of the maltreatment of children (Rugova mentioned the Lipljan incident), with the aim of creating what Rugova called a collaborationist attitude among the children. Raids on Albanian houses are continuing under the pretext of searching for weapons. Moreover, the public distribution of weapons for Serbs and Montenegrins is continuing, as in Suhareke [Suva Reka], and Prizren. There have also been raids on Albanian houses in the border area with Albania, Rugova said.

There have also been cases in which Albanian youths have been maltreated while being recruited, and in which Albanian houses have been surrounded by up to 40 policemen, as in Istok. The maltreatment and imprisonment of the political activists of the LDK, the other Albanian parties, and the Independent Trade Unions has continued, probably reaching its peak in the final days of last week and during this week.

The ballet ensemble was also closed down this week, allegedly because of overstaffing, and this is another measure to close down and extinguish Albanian institutions.

The LDK chairman said that the Kosovo Writers Association and the Albanian PEN Club protested the arrest of Shqip Beqiri and his sentence to 40 days' imprisonment. He was arrested and imprisoned in Kraljevo while

returning from abroad, solely because he was found in possession of some Albanian-language books.

Rugova said that the application of enforced measures continued in the remaining institutions of Kosovo last week. The aim of all this is to drive out the Albanians from Kosovo, a policy pursued before the war and during the Rankovic era. However, we ask the Albanians not to leave Kosovo, as some intend. The Albanians have always lived and will remain in Kosovo, regardless of the repression and everything that is happening.

We have said before and say again that everything now happening in Kosovo is an attempt to incite some kind of conflict. However, we remind the Serbian regime, the Army, and all those working for them that any conflict in Kosovo would be a tragedy for everybody who lives here.

Ending his remarks on the repression in Kosovo, Rugova showed journalists some documents from Elektroekonomia, dismissing Albanians from their jobs on the basis of shocking regulations on the use of the Serbian language and Cyrillic script in everyday communication, which Serbia demands that the remaining Albanian workers obey.

The Wise Sit at a Table To Talk Before Fighting

Rugova welcomed the arrival of the ships of world powers in the Adriatic in order to bring humanitarian aid for the people of Dubrovnik and the coast. According to Rugova, the arrival of these ships is not a demonstration of force, and anyone who interprets differently the presence of these ships only wants conflicts and problems.

All the Albanian political parties in Kosovo and the entire Albanian people, Rugova said, ask for the deployment of blue helmets in Kosovo too, as a prophylactic measure against any possible conflict. We ask for international supervision by the United Nations in order to eliminate discrimination in Kosovo. We also again demand Kosovo's demilitarization as the sole and best way of solving the question of Kosovo peacefully.

As part of the international assistance for Yugoslavia, Rugova said, we also ask for humanitarian aid to be sent to Kosovo. We insist that international humanitarian organizations be enabled to bring humanitarian, medical, and other aid to Kosovo, because this has so far been totally blocked. The most recent case in which the delivery of humanitarian aid was obstructed was last year, when aid sent by the French ministry and the International Medical Association did not arrive in Kosovo because of obstacles raised by Serbia.

Concluding his comments on the present situation, Rugova asked for an end to the war in Croatia, because this senseless war has caused many casualties and large-scale material devastation. We must learn lessons from this war and commit ourselves to dialogue and a peaceful solution to problems. The wise sit at a table to talk before fighting, and even those who want blood and horror must inevitably sit down at a common table to talk after the war. We, Rugova said, still stand by our declarations

that problems must be solved in a peaceful way, and this is not merely a phrase for us, as it is for some people who say one thing and do another.

The Truth Cannot Be Concealed

Radio Macedonia's correspondent started the round of journalists' questions, asking Dr. Ibrahim Rugova whether he could say something more about his meeting with Austrian Ambassador Walter Siegel in Belgrade and what he could say about the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution without the Albanians' presence.

Rugova said that he had met Mr. Jan Silen, Swedish ambassador to Belgrade, last Monday [19 Nov], and Mr. Walter Siegel, the Austrian ambassador, the day before yesterday [21 Nov]. These meetings were all-embracing, because we informed these high-ranking guests about our standpoints and our opinions on solving the crisis. The Austrian ambassador expressed regret at everything that is happening to the Albanians in Kosovo and said that the Austrian Government will continue to commit itself to the Albanians' human and national rights. Rugova said that this visit was very successful for us. Meanwhile, as for the adoption of the Macedonian Constitution, the LDK chairman said that the Albanians were within their rights not to vote, but that it would have been in order to include the demands of the Albanians of Macedonia in the new Constitution, because they make up 40 percent of the general population. The Albanians had the civil right not to vote for this Constitution and not to feel it was their own. I hope that the Macedonian state will not do any harm to the Albanians.

Belgrade Television's correspondent asked what the LDK's stand was on the formation of the new federal government, and Rugova said that the old government must stand, because the rump of the Federal Assembly does not possess the legitimacy to form a new federal government.

Another journalist asked how Dr. Rugova would comment on the silence of the Serbian press over the tragic death of the lawyer Mikel Marku following police torture and the most recent threats of the Chetnik Seselj. Rugova said that the Serbian press's silence over Mikel Marku's death was not surprising, because, as far as politics is concerned, these media want to hide everything that happens in Kosovo, pretending that everything here is in order. However, the truth penetrates everywhere in the world.

As for Seselj's threats, I have never wished to comment on what he says and does. However, if you insist, I think that what Seselj is doing is primitive idiocy, threatening individuals and people. He is welcome to what he says. Seselj's threats and behavior do not deserve any attention.

Another journalist asked about Shevardnadze's return to the Soviet political stage, and Dr. Ibrahim Rugova said that Shevardnadze's return strengthens Gorbachev's policies, because he is a high-caliber diplomat and will no doubt exert great influence on the processes of European integration.

JEDINSTVO's journalist asked how Rugova could think of the arrival of blue helmets in Kosovo, when it is well known that they only go where there are conflicts, in order to separate the opposing sides.

Rugova said that we do not have open physical conflict in Kosovo, but the arrival of Blue Helmets would have a prophylactic effect in forestalling possible conflict and would stop the daily police repression in Kosovo. Blue helmets should be stationed in Kosovo, because we have here a second front of repression and discrimination, he said.

VEČERNJI LIST's journalist asked whether Rugova had officially asked for the arrival of blue helmets in Kosovo.

Rugova said that we will do this in the next few days, but that what has been said at this news conference is in fact an official invitation.

FLAKA E VELLAZERIMIT's correspondent asked, "War is taking place in Croatia, and foreign diplomats are visiting Pristina. Do you think that this is a sign that they are frightened of a possible front opening in Kosovo?" Rugova said that these diplomatic contacts show that the world supports our peaceful resistance and is aware that this costs us dearly as human beings, but that this method will yield greater and longer-lasting results. The visits of foreign diplomats are important for us. They want to be present in Kosovo, while we maintain regular diplomatic contacts at many levels.

Assembly Appeals for Support of Albanian People

*AU2811173191 Tirana Radio Tirana Network
in Albanian 1430 GMT 28 Nov 91*

[Text] A message of the Kosovo Republican Assembly and the Government of the Republic of Kosovo addressed to all Albanians on the 79th anniversary of the declaration of independence and the hoisting of the flag states:

Brothers and sisters, as we recall the situation of total occupation 79 years ago, when the sons and heroes of our people proclaimed Albania's independence, we cannot fail to compare it with the present situation in Kosovo and other Albanian territories in former Yugoslavia, where the cruelty of the foreign occupier holds sway. This grave situation obliges us all to redouble our efforts and to follow the example of our ancestors in making the world recognize the Republic of Kosovo today, just as it recognized Albania 79 years ago, and to recognize the inalienable right of self-determination of the Albanian people that live on their own territories in the fictitious state of Yugoslavia.

At these difficult times, as we walk on a tightrope above an abyss of war, we need more than ever before to show

our level of historical responsibility, not to allow ourselves to be surprised by the bloody examples of the Balkan Wars, not to allow any repetition of the terrible winters of 1919 and 1945, and to be on the watch for any provocation and ready for sacrifice.

The message of the Assembly and government of the Republic of Kosovo later states:

As when the Ottoman Empire collapsed long ago, so as the Yugoslav empire collapses today, imperialist Serbia is trying to expand at all costs, invading the lands of others. As far as one can see, Serbian aggression will not stop before setting the entire Balkans aflame. We therefore turn to our blood-brothers and brothers in pain in Albania. Rouse yourselves from sloth. Realize that anarchy and democracy are not the same thing. Bear in mind that you are facing a grave peril, and do not forget that the 3 million Albanians suffering under a foreign heel are waiting for you to strengthen Albania and to lift it out of the mire of anarchy and danger.

We call on you to unite, organize, and mobilize yourselves, because our efforts are now embarking on a new stage, while the crisis in Yugoslavia and the Balkans is entering its final phase. Therefore, your support for the efforts of the people of Kosovo and other Albanian territories is more necessary than ever, so that we may pass one of the most important crossroads in our age-old history with as few consequences as possible, the message of the Assembly and Government of the Republic of Kosovo concludes.

Kosovars Celebrate National Holiday of Albania

AU2811174391 Belgrade Radio Belgrade Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 28 Nov 91

[Report by Milivoje Mihajlovic]

[Text] The Albanian-language press is today brimming with articles marking the day of the Republic of Albania. It is stated this is a day of all Albanians, and reminded that Albanians from all regions declared their independence on 28 November 1912.

BUJKU carries on its cover a message by Ibrahim Rugova, president of the Democratic Alliance of Kosovo, in which it is emphasized that the Albanians in Yugoslavia are denied the right to commemorate 28 November. Rugova points out the Albanians in a disintegrating Yugoslavia are deprived of their rights, but he considers the members of this nationality have achieved spiritual liberation, regardless of where they live, and they are, as Rugova says, stronger than ever before. He expresses a belief that the Day of the Republic of Albania will also be celebrated in liberated Kosovo.

This paper also carries congratulations Ibrahim Rugova sent to Albanian President Ramiz Alia on this occasion. The press is full of articles and photographs of the personalities from the history of Albania, especially of Ismail Qemali. It seems this holiday, which used to be

commemorated by demonstrations of the Albanian separatists in the few past years, is now used to encourage Albanians to persist in the realization of the idea of Greater Albania, because the majority of them have realized that this idea is impracticable.

Bosnia-Herzegovina

President Izetbegovic Addresses SDA Congress

AU0212171191 Sarajevo Radio Sarajevo Network
in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 29 Nov 91

[Mujo Delibegovic report on speech by Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Party of Democratic Action and president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the first day of the Party of Democratic Action congress in Sarajevo on 29 November]

[Text] The circumstances and the times are really unusual. Unfortunately, they are unusual in the negative sense of the word. Bosnia-Herzegovina and its citizens, and thereby the Muslim people as well, are going through the most dramatic moments of the last 100 years. This is a choice between war and peace, Alija Izetbegovic, president of the Party of Democratic Action [SDA], said at the beginning of his speech.

Bosnia has known war and peace in the past, too, Izetbegovic went on to say. What makes the present situation exceptional and unprecedented is the fact that the war that is ominously looming over us would not be an ordinary war. A war in the present Bosnia would be a total war, and many of the main participants in the events are either not aware of this fact or are behaving as if they are not aware of it.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] The Army is moving throughout Bosnia as if everything is (perfectly in order). Some new cartographers, completely unaware of the fact that they are sitting on a powder keg, are drawing some new maps and dividing Bosnia at will. They say that they do not like these Bosnian borders, 300 or more years old and made in political changes of titanic strength during a long and tumultuous history. According to them, these borders are administrative and arbitrary, and the borders that they are now drawing in party offices full of cigarette smoke are right and historical borders. As if their borders are not arbitrary and administrative. If the powder keg explodes, everything will vanish in smoke and shame, both cartographers and generals, all parties and all leaders, all laws and institutions, and most of what has been built in this region over the years through the hard work of dozens of generations. The only thing left, since they are, unfortunately, indestructible, will be the three defeated peoples, stained with blood, frenzied, and pushed to the brink of barbarism.

Confronted with this gloomy prospect, our party favors peace and the avoidance of any risk of conflict. The

greater the danger, the greater and more resolute our orientation toward peace. [end recording]

Of course, the SDA also has its specific aims, Izetbegovic went on to say, but, striving for peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the party represents all citizens of the republic equally in this respect, because maintaining peace and avoiding conflict is doubtlessly the highest aim of everybody in this country.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] This interest motivated our earlier advocacy of the survival of Yugoslavia. As you know, this was during the period at the beginning of the party's work. During last year and just before the beginning of this year, we were stressing our support for the survival of Yugoslavia. In the period following this, we supported the maintenance of a form of the Yugoslav community, something we are doing now as well. This seemed to us to be the only way to find a way out by political means, so that everybody will get something, if it is impossible for everybody to get something. We believed that all other roads, which imply secession and a truncated Yugoslavia, mutually connected and conditioned by one another, lead through violence and conflict. Unfortunately, we were wrong. We continue to believe—it is now a bit utopian—that a form of a community of peoples or republics that used to form Yugoslavia is both desirable and possible. This is why we unreservedly accepted the Hague document that offered such a prospect.

Everybody who knows at least something about the development of political communities also knows that a loose community, that is, even a loose community—if it is based upon human rights and a free market—will have a tendency to gradually turn into a firmer community. The process of integration in Europe, which started off as the European Coal and Steel Community, and is today turning into a great European federation is best confirming this. Those people who did not want the renewal of any Yugoslavia, either today or in the distant future, and either upon old or new European bases, have rejected the Hague paper. They were the Slovenes and the Serbs. Unlike the usual pattern, this time the Slovenes have done so openly and Serbs under a guise. In the name of their independence, the Slovenes have clearly rejected the idea of any new Yugoslavia, or a new Yugoslav community. The Serbs have rejected the new Yugoslavia in the name of Yugoslavia in quotation marks. Of course, the latter is not really Yugoslavia, and that is the first reason that it is not acceptable to us.

The second and more important reason is that this future formation that is offered to us and is formulated in the so-called Belgrade initiative is not democratic. Namely, we could live with anybody and within any community under the condition that this community is democratic. However, on this territory of ours, judging from everything, democracy is a matter of a long process and for the considerably distant future.

In such a situation, a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina within a free community is the only guarantee for us that we will be living in dignity and freedom. [applause] We are certain that this is the case, not only as regards the Muslim people, but also as regards the Serbian and Croatian peoples. Considering the composition of its population, such a Bosnia-Herzegovina must have special relations with Serbia on one side and with Croatia on the other, regardless of whether these two republics, that is, states, are mutually connected in any way. We think that this can be solved. The Serbs must not feel that they are separated from Serbia by a state border and the Croats must not have that feeling about Croatia. Therefore, there is no [word indistinct] for Serbs on the Drina and for the Croats on the Una and the Sava.

Serbia and Croatia are national states. Bosnia-Herzegovina is not this and it can only be a civilian [gradjanski] republic. [applause] For it is no Muslims, Serbs, and Croats who live in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but a national mixture of these three peoples, including, of course, a smaller number of members of other peoples. If somebody wants to speak about the self-determination of peoples in the ethnic sense of the term, he must explain how this otherwise indisputable principle is to be applied to a mixture of peoples found, for example, in Sarajevo or in Bosnia-Herzegovina in general.

Therefore, the right question for Bosnia-Herzegovina is not whether to carry out self-determination of peoples, but how to do so with a mixture of peoples. Nobody has so far given a decisive and clear theoretical answer to that. Of course, there is a practical answer, and it is the historical formula of Bosnia as a multid denominational, multinational, and multicultural community.

Why would one mar something that has been created by a fortunate combination of historical circumstances, has been functioning well, and also represents a humane, democratic, and, one may also say, a European solution. Why would one change that even if it had been possible, and particularly why do so if it is impossible without violence and blood and if a retrograde concept of national autocracy is offered along with that change? [end recording]

After calling on fellow citizens, Serbs and Croats, and neighbors, Serbs and Croats, as well as their leaders, to search together for a humane way out of this conflict in order to save our peoples from the suffering, of which we have seen too much recently, Alija Izetbegovic devoted a considerable part of his speech to the neutralization and demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] [applause] We have declared neutrality in this war because it is a dirty fratricidal war with which we must not and should not sully our hands. [applause] We refused to send our boys to that war, because it is not a war for freedom. In this way, we have saved the lives and souls of many of our people. [applause] We have saved their lives, because they did not get killed, and their souls because they did

not kill. Therefore, we prevented them from becoming either executioners or victims. This stand of ours enjoyed support of all people of good will here and abroad. It has immensely increased Bosnia's standing in the world. In these times when you are justifiably ashamed of some things that are happening in these regions, if you happen to be in a foreign country, you can rightly say that you are from Bosnia-Herzegovina [Herzeg-Bosna]. [applause] That means (?there) that you support [applause] peace, democracy, and human rights. [applause] We have [Izetbegovic is interrupted by applause] we have proclaimed the demilitarization of Bosnia-Herzegovina and this remains our ideal and a distant aim. True, it is [the matter] of the moment, perhaps because a completely opposite process is under way in Bosnia-Herzegovina at the moment. At the moment, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a piece of land with probably the highest concentration of army and military equipment in Europe. We do not intend to solve this problem by confrontation, nor is this possible. This process will last some time. The Army should be helped to transform itself and professional soldiers and their families should be guaranteed their rights: jobs, pensions, apartments, and so on. [end recording]

Alija Izetbegovic in particular touched upon the role of the Army and asked several questions in that respect.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] First, what are the Army's war aims in Croatia? For instance, why the attack on Dubrovnik? Second, how come there is so much ruthlessness in waging war and why is it so? In order to kill one man in uniform on the other side, mass shelling of populated places kills several dozen civilians, most frequently women and children. What can justify this? Third, why are there missiles in Bosnia-Herzegovina? What are they there for? Of course, these are not the only questions, but they are now the most important ones. [end recording]

Alija Izetbegovic devoted the concluding part of his speech to economic and party matters. He emphasized in particular that the SDA should take care of poor and threatened regions, such as the Zenica and Cazin regions.

[Begin Izetbegovic recording] Zenica should be [word indistinct] and given back its image and identity that it has lost. It should become the center of all steel processing facilities, which is not the case now. There is a strong concentration of cadres and resources in Zenica.

As concerns the Cazin region, the Agrokomerc Organization, which is now mostly looking after itself, should be helped as much as possible. As you remember, this was one of our election campaign promises that we failed to fulfill, or at least failed to fulfill completely, but it must not be forgotten.

Regarding economic measures in general, we should continue reprivatization. However, because the issue of shares has, in some cases, virtually turned into robbery of social or state property owing to insufficient control and unsuitable systems, the present practice of issuing

shares should be urgently stopped. Our assembly deputies should immediately implement decisions and legal measures in this respect. [applause]

Today's congress should be used to introduce new, particularly longer people into management bodies. The party is huge, because it includes, either as members or supporters, the entire Muslim people not only in Yugoslavia, but also in the entire world. [applause] However, it has begun to resemble a premature baby with a small head and large body. Services in the party's center have remained underdeveloped and cannot meet increased demands. Among other things, the concentration of offices in one person has certainly contributed to that. These shortcomings have been spotted and it is planned to take measures at this congress designed to remove these shortcomings efficiently. I think that the road has been opened in this respect. [end recording]

SDA Urges International Recognition of Republics

LD0112003691 Belgrade TANJUG in English
2018 GMT 30 Nov 91

[Text] Sarajevo, November 30 (TANJUG)—The Party of Democratic Action (SDA) in the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today urged international recognition of independence of all Yugoslav republics and the creation of a community of these independent states.

Officials of SDA, which rallies Moslems and is the strongest in the three-party coalition in the republic, told a news conference that economic and other ties with the other Yugoslav republics should not be severed, noting that Bosnia-Herzegovina could economically survive as an independent state and would not be a part of a "rump Yugoslavia."

SDA officials told the news conference, held on the beginning of the SDA Congress which opened yesterday, that the independence of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be based on intensive links with the Yugoslav Republics of Croatia and Serbia. The population of Bosnia-Herzegovina is 43.7 percent Moslem 31.47 percent Serbian and 17.34 percent Croatian.

SDA officials said that a U.N. peacekeeping force was called to come to Bosnia-Herzegovina to preserve peace, adding that it should be deployed in crisis regions in the republic.

Work of the SDA Congress today continued in commissions. A stand was expressed at the session of the commission for internal policy that Bosnia-Herzegovina should be an autonomous and independent state with a professional army, its own currency and diplomatic and consular offices in those countries which would recognize it.

Socialist Democrats Calls For Preserving Nation*LD3011172791 Belgrade TANJUG in English
1854 GMT 29 Nov 91*

[Text] Jajce, Nov 29 (TANJUG)—Nijaz Durakovic, leader of the Socialist Democratic Party of the Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, today called for the preservation of Yugoslavia.

The Socialist Democratic Party, the successor of the League of Communists and a leading opposition party in Bosnia-Herzegovina, is the only party in that Republic which observed the Yugoslav state holiday, Republic Day—November 29.

Socialist Democratic Party leader Durakovic laid a wreath at the bust of Josip Broz Tito at the Museum of the Second Session of the Anti-Fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia (AVNOJ) in Jajce.

Durakovic said, "none of those who care for freedom, equality and democracy will accept the disintegration of the Yugoslav community as a lasting fact."

Durakovic said that federalism, as the principle of Yugoslavia's state order, was "the most significant and far-reaching decision of the AVNOJ session in Jajce."

Leader of the Socialist Democratic Party of Bosnia-Herzegovina said that his party would never recognize either the disintegration or partitioning of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Durakovic said that his party wanted Yugoslavia to be organized as an alliance of sovereign republics which would have common policies in certain areas, which he said ought to be defined through democratic negotiations.

Bosnia-Herzegovina is currently governed by a coalition of three national parties which represent the three numerically strongest nations in the republic—Muslims, Serbs and Croats.

Article Examines Issue of Military Industry*92BA0133A Belgrade EKONOMSKA POLITIKA
in Serbo-Croatian 4 Nov 91 pp 10-11*

[Article by K.S.: "The Last Gasp"]

[Text] The economy of Bosnia-Herzegovina has come upon the most difficult days in its postwar development. This Yugoslav republic, although it is not waging war, nor are combat operations being conducted on its territory, has been suffering immense material and other losses because of its central position in Yugoslavia. The severing of all types of communications with the other parts of the country as well as with the world threatens to bring economic life in the republic to a complete halt. Bosnia-Herzegovina is an economic victim of the war between Serbia and Croatia, the observers of the European Community declared after touring a major portion of Bosnia-Herzegovina territory.

Recently, there have been more frequent cries from economic entities for the Bosnia-Herzegovina government to do something to reestablish communications and normalize the situation in the republic. Representatives of the Bosnia-Herzegovina defense industry, which in its technology and production has the strongest industrial potential in the central Yugoslav republic, are becoming increasingly vocal among them. The hints and rumors that the most up-to-date documentation and equipment parts are being gradually moved in the greatest secrecy out of Bosnia-Herzegovina have added to the uneasiness of the work force and the entire Bosnia-Herzegovina public, and a surplus of several tens of thousands of workers are being left as a burden on a republic that is already experiencing severe financial exhaustion. These rumors were given a kind of public confirmation in early October when the agenda of a session of the Chamber of Citizens of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly included a report on the condition, problems, and possible restructuring of the defense industry in the republic. The republic government, which submitted the report, wanted to use the customary annual debate to find out how to help the defense industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina to overcome the business difficulties it is having at the moment. However, the debate took a quite different direction and revealed the full severity and delicacy of this industry's position after everything that has happened in Yugoslavia in recent months. The government and Economic Chamber were harshly criticized because of their inertness and failure to take virtually any measures to protect this most valuable industrial potential, to restructure it and use it as a flywheel that could be decisive in developing the Bosnia-Herzegovina economy, which has died. Not only because this complex has a work force of 30,000 (that was actually the number last year; it has diminished quite a bit in the meantime), nor solely because of those hundreds of thousands who are dependent on it, but, as Roko Markovina, himself an employee in the "Soko" defense firm in Mostar, said in the Assembly debate, because of those 500,000 people who are more or less bound up with that industry. The fact is that the workers in the defense industry, among them many who are highly educated, have never been worse off. At the level of Yugoslavia, about 35,000 of them are receiving the minimum wage, and a third of these are in Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the earnings of the remainder of the work force are below the republic average and amount to about 4,500 dinars. Utilization of production capacity has dropped below 50 percent, and in the enterprises "Slavko Rodic" and "Zrak" it has even fallen to 30 percent.

How does the defense industry conduct its business, how has business policy been conducted, especially foreign trade policy, how have prices been set, and what have sales been within Yugoslavia? These are questions that the competent authorities must answer in order to bring about conditions for a future agreement on restructuring this industry and adapting it to the business conditions of the market. Osman Pirija, a deputy, called attention to

the fact that qualitative indicators are not available on the claims of the Bosnian defense industry concerning business with Iraq. Bosnia-Herzegovina alone has claims amounting to more than \$100 million. "Our public is not aware that the risk of exports to Iraq and Iran is borne by the manufacturing enterprises, not the exporters. That is, the exporter, to whom all the export transactions were turned over, concluded contracts in Belgrade at a time when almost no Western country wanted to take the risk of exports, because there was reliable information that Iraq was about to collapse and would not be able to meet its obligations.... Now this risk falls on our enterprises," Pirija said. He argued in favor of energetic protection of the defense industry, which, in his words, is being dispersed and scattered without any control whatsoever, so that Bosnia-Herzegovina would have at least a part of the property with which to continue drafting new development programs for cooperation not only at the level of Yugoslavia, but even at the European level.

In spite of what was said about the defense industry, Salih Burek, deputy, feels that this segment of the Bosnia-Herzegovina industry ought to play a decisive role in pulling the economy out of the crisis, because this is an industry which in its technological performances and personnel is ahead of a number of other industrial branches. But if the defense industry is to adapt to market conditions, it must be freed from administrative and military restrictions. This is clear, because even this industry cannot survive at a time when the Army is using its monopoly position to dictate the prices of armament and military equipment and when it is using extreme and subjective methods of distribution.

"The restructuring that awaits the military-industry complex will not occur without difficulties, because money has to be added that does not exist either in the federal or republic budget nor in the commercial banks. It ought to be in the federal budget, because up to now the split has always been 50:50 for the Army's current needs and for the defense industry. Today, the Army is squandering money without mercy," Tomislav Obrdaj, deputy, said, and illustrated this with several examples. It costs \$50,000 for an airplane to take off, not counting the value of missiles, bombs, and destroyed property. One round from a tank costs \$300 and from a mortar \$80-400, depending on the caliber, and so on.

The deputies debated with great bitterness the cases of covert evacuation of military equipment and the transfer of entire production lines from factories in Bosnia-Herzegovina to factories in Serbia. Tomislav Obrdaj backed up this assertion of his with figures. Expensive design documentation has been taken from "Pretis" (Vogosce), and there have been attempts to transfer some of the equipment and documentation from "Soko" in Mostar. Several enterprises ("Igman," "Pretis," "Slavko Rodic," "Pobjeda") in Bosnia-Herzegovina have been given an order to send certain inventories of production

supplies to new locations in eastern sections of the country, and those enterprises themselves have been left without 80 percent of the production supplies necessary for normal production. There are many indications that the war industry for shells and explosives has been moved from "Slavko Rodic" to Uzice, that preparations are being made to move the air academy and production documentation from Rajlovac to Serbia, and there are a number of other similar pieces of information.

In the light of all that, the Assembly at one time ordered the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina to study all the circumstances that have brought the defense industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina to the edge of ruin and, in particular, data on removal of documentation and plants from the republic and to prepare a full report in the shortest time. That deadline of one month has already passed, many unexpected things have been happening with the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly, the government is not saying anything in public about this case, and the situation in the economy is getting worse and worse every day. Although General Veljko Kadijevic recently said that there has been no removal of particular production supplies classified as "war reserves" and that these are rumors without any basis whatsoever, it is obvious that something is happening to the defense industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina. What?—we hope that we will find out before it is too late.

In its technical and technological potential, its creative and specialized personnel, and also because of the size of its labor force, military production constitutes an important, if not even the most important, segment of Bosnia-Herzegovina's industry. Because it has a share of 40 percent in the total volume of Yugoslavia's production of armament and military equipment, its fate has a multiple impact on the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the other Yugoslav republics. There are 12 entities in Bosnia-Herzegovina that have the status of defense manufacturers, and they are organized in six holding companies with some 50 joint-stock companies ("Pretis," "Professional Electronics," "Igman," "Pobjeda," "Zrak," and "Slavko Rodic"), five socialized enterprises ("Slobodan Princip Seljo," "Machine and Hydraulic Factory," "Special Transmission Factory," "Special-Purpose Motor Factory," and "Special Vehicle Factory"), and the aircraft industry "Soko," which is organized as a joint-stock company under mixed ownership. At the beginning of the year, the defense industry of Bosnia-Herzegovina employed about 30,000 workers, which constitutes 40 percent of all the members of the community INVOJ (Yugoslav Industry for Military Equipment and Armament). Back last year, a surplus of 8,418 workers was ascertained. A reemployment program found a solution for 2,500 of the employees. No one is offering any permanent solution for the rest of the workers, nor for those who have lost their jobs this year (4,000-5,000 workers).